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ABSTRACT 
  Securities regulation has traditionally focused on encouraging 
truthful disclosure that facilitates the accurate pricing of securities. A 
typical securities fraud claim under the primary antifraud provision, 
Rule 10b-5, must thus point to a misrepresentation or omission that is 
material to investors. At the same time, it is undeniable that Rule 
10b-5 has been extended to conduct that does not fit this traditional 
conception of fraud, most notably insider trading. This Article shows 
that such deviations have become more common as Rule 10b-5 has 
increasingly become concerned with the problem of unjust 
enrichment. In numerous areas, the courts have applied Rule 10b-5 to 
deceptive conduct that is not directed at the market or investors but 
unjustly enriches some individual. Surprisingly, the unjust enrichment 
principle has functioned not only as an expander of liability but also 
as a limit. More and more, securities fraud class actions directed at 
market-distorting misrepresentations may only proceed if insiders 
have been enriched by the misrepresentation. The rise of the unjust 
enrichment principle demonstrates that securities regulation is not 
only concerned with the economic value of market efficiency but also 
is significantly influenced by public values. Securities regulation is 
guided by an evolving principle that sets some limits on the ability to 
extract wrongful gains from the securities markets. Though unjust 
enrichment is undeniably a concern of Rule 10b-5, it should be a 
second-order concern subordinate to the first-order concern of 
efficient markets. 
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INTRODUCTION 
According to the conventional account, securities regulation is 
based primarily on a policy of truthful disclosure.1 Rather than 
regulating markets with a heavy hand, the securities laws facilitate the 
operation of efficient markets by encouraging the disclosure of 
accurate information. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
(SEC) Rule 10b-5 is the primary legal enforcement mechanism that 
polices the truth of company disclosures to investors and the market.2 
Consistent with a disclosure regime, and despite its vague and 
expansive text, Rule 10b-5 has been mainly viewed as an antifraud 
rule.3 As Justice Lewis Powell declared in an often-quoted passage in 
 
 1. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977) (“[O]nce full and fair 
disclosure has occurred, the fairness of the terms of the transaction is at most a tangential 
concern of the statute.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and 
the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 669 (1984) (“The securities laws . . . . had and 
still have two basic components: a prohibition against fraud, and requirements of disclosure 
when securities are issued and periodically thereafter.”). 
 2. Rule 10b-5 reads: 
Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices. 
  It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any 
national securities exchange, 
  (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
  (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading, or 
  (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,  
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
  Rule 10b-5 implements Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(Exchange Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78oo (2006 & Supp. III 2009), which makes it unlawful “[t]o 
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . , any manipulative or 
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors.” 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 3. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 666 n.27 (1983) (“[T]o constitute a violation of 
Rule 10b-5, there must be fraud.”); David S. Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial 
Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 NW. U. L. REV. 627, 665 (1963) (“All three subsections of 
section 17(a) and Rule 10b-5 should be viewed as fraud sections and recovery should be allowed 
only in the event that the fraud can be discovered.”); Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral 
Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375, 407 (1999) (“The idea of ‘fraud’ is 
important in insider trading law not only because the Supreme Court has recognized the 
concept as a limit to expanding liability, but also because ‘the proscription of fraud’ expresses 
one of the basic purposes of federal securities regulation.” (footnote omitted)); Steve Thel, The 
Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 409 
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Chiarella v. United States,4 “[s]ection 10 (b) is aptly described as a 
catchall provision, but what it catches must be fraud.”5 By punishing 
companies that mislead the market, Rule 10b-5 provides an additional 
incentive to comply with mandatory disclosure laws,6 helping create 
the foundations for an efficient securities market and protecting 
investors who rely upon such disclosures. Securities regulation is thus 
commonly seen as primarily promoting economic efficiency.7 
Despite the cleanness of the efficient-markets conception of Rule 
10b-5,8 the prohibition of insider trading has made it difficult to think 
of Rule 10b-5 as a rule exclusively concerned with fraud. Insider 
trading doctrine has developed in fits and starts because of the 
difficulty of characterizing insider trading as fraud.9 Indeed, despite 
the fact that they both originate from Rule 10b-5, insider trading and 
securities fraud doctrine are often treated as unrelated bodies of law. 
Unlike fraudulent statements directed at investors or the market, the 
primary wrong of insider trading is not market harm but rather the 
 
(1990) (“[U]nderlying the Supreme Court’s rule 10b-5 cases is the image of a statute directed at 
nothing more than promoting candor and eliminating fraud.”). 
  Despite the doctrine developed by the courts, there are questions as to whether the 
legislative history of the securities laws supports the hegemony of the antifraud rule. See, e.g., 
Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1047, 1068–88 (1995) (arguing that disclosure statutes addressed the problem of promoters who 
could unjustly enrich themselves through stock offerings); Thel, supra, at 460 (arguing that the 
Securities Exchange Act is directed in part at manipulation by speculators). 
  Moreover, there is an inevitable overlap between fraud prohibited by the federal 
securities laws and state corporate-governance issues. See James D. Cox, Fraud Is in the Eyes of 
the Beholder: Rule 10b-5’s Application to Acts of Corporate Mismanagement, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
674, 691 n.75 (1972). 
 4. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 5. Id. at 234–35; see also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 
(1971) (“We agree that Congress by § 10 (b) did not seek to regulate transactions which 
constitute no more than internal corporate mismanagement.”). For an analysis of Justice 
Powell’s role in shaping Rule 10b-5 doctrine, see A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 
and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 930–45 (2003). 
 6. Of course, companies have reputational incentives to disclose truthful information. The 
market will likely punish the stock price of companies with management that routinely lies to 
the market. 
 7. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency 
Paradox, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 10 (“[S]ecurities law . . . focuses primarily on the goal of 
economic efficiency in lieu of distributional objectives.”). 
 8. As Elizabeth Warren notes in the bankruptcy context, “clean” explanations are not 
always the best. See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 811 (1987) 
(“I have offered a dirty, complex, elastic, interconnected view of bankruptcy from which I can 
neither predict outcomes nor even necessarily fully articulate all the factors relevant to a policy 
decision.”). 
 9. See infra Part II.A.2. 
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benefit extracted by the individual who wrongfully exploits inside 
information. Others have thus noted that insider trading can be 
described as a form of unjust enrichment,10 though there has been 
discomfort with extending Rule 10b-5 beyond its traditional focus on 
fraud.11 Therefore, the insider trading prohibition and its link to 
unjust enrichment have largely been treated as an embarrassing but 
isolated anomaly in Rule 10b-5 doctrine. 
This Article argues that, far from being an ancillary concern, the 
unjust enrichment principle has increasingly defined the scope of 
Rule 10b-5. Rule 10b-5 is becoming just as much an unjust 
enrichment rule as it is an efficient-markets rule. The Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. O’Hagan12 conclusively established 
that Rule 10b-5 could be directed at deceptions whose primary harm 
is unjust enrichment rather than fraud that hinders efficient markets.13 
By adopting a misappropriation theory of insider trading, O’Hagan 
recognized that Rule 10b-5 is not limited to fraudulent statements 
directed at the market or investors. Instead, O’Hagan held that Rule 
10b-5 can be triggered by deceptions directed at non–market 
participants, so long as those deceptions coincide with a securities 
transaction. In doing so, O’Hagan extended Rule 10b-5 to cover 
unjust enrichment that does not directly distort the market. In the 
wake of O’Hagan, the unjust enrichment principle has expanded the 
scope of Rule 10b-5 in a number of areas, including cases directed at 
broker-dealer misappropriation and mutual-fund market timing.14 
 
 10. See, e.g., WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 3.5.2 (2d 
ed. 1996) (“The public perception is that much stock market insider trading unjustly enriches 
the information possessor.”); Donald C. Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary 
Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 26 (1982) (asserting that the 
prohibition of insider trading is based on a principle that prohibits fiduciaries from unjustly 
enriching themselves); Saikrishna Prakash, Our Dysfunctional Insider Trading Regime, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1491, 1500 (1999) (“[M]any securities market participants view insider trading 
as the wholly unjust enrichment of those privy to significant confidential information.”); Robert 
B. Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule 10b-5: A Restitution Alternative to Tort 
Damages, 37 VAND. L. REV. 349, 395–96 (1984) (observing that the “prohibition [of insider 
trading] is aimed at preventing insiders’ unjust enrichment,” not at compensating victims). 
 11. See, e.g., Strudler & Orts, supra note 3, at 407 (“But the unjust enrichment principle, 
taken as a full explanation of the prohibition against insider trading, would prove too much. If 
one accepted unjust enrichment as the basic justification for what is wrong with insider trading, 
there is no reason why the principle should apply only to the illegal acquisition or misuse of 
information.”). 
 12. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 13. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 14. See infra Part III. 
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Securities fraud and insider trading doctrine in many ways have 
been unified by the unjust enrichment principle. In addition to its 
expansive influence with respect to insider trading, the unjust 
enrichment principle has also played a role in limiting the scope of 
Rule 10b-5 with respect to securities fraud class actions. Although the 
efficient-markets and unjust-enrichment conceptions of Rule 10b-5 
have largely been two ships passing in the night, there has been 
tension between the two paradigms as courts have used the unjust 
enrichment principle to restrict the reach of securities fraud class 
actions. In determining whether a defendant in a securities fraud class 
action acted with scienter, the courts often require the plaintiff to 
allege that a defendant received a “concrete benefit” in order for the 
case to proceed.15 Some commentators have gone so far as to propose 
that only securities fraud class actions involving allegations of insider 
trading should be permitted.16 Thus, even in the context of punishing 
market-distorting fraud, courts often focus on the issue of unjust 
enrichment. 
The rise of the unjust enrichment principle demonstrates that 
securities regulation is not solely concerned with technical efficiency 
concerns but also relates to targeting conduct that offends public 
values.17 Though it is an essential part of securities regulation, the 
danger of the unjust enrichment principle is its potential to divert the 
attention of Rule 10b-5 from its primary purpose: encouraging 
efficient markets. To check this tendency, it makes sense to think of 
Rule 10b-5 as having two distinct concerns. The first-order concern is 
to prohibit significant misstatements that distort the ability of the 
market to value a stock correctly. The second-order concern is to 
target unjust enrichment relating to misconduct that does not 
necessarily impact market prices but that offends the public values 
reflected by the unjust enrichment principle. Securities regulation not 
only helps markets function efficiently but also is guided by a 
 
 15. See infra Part IV.B. 
 16. See infra Part IV.C. 
 17. This distinction reflects ideas from an earlier article noting the contrast between an 
administrative approach that emphasizes cost-benefit analysis and a public-values approach. See 
James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57 DUKE L.J. 625, 662–74 
(2007) (contrasting the administrative and public-values approaches). In the antitrust context, 
there is a similar contrast between economic and political approaches to regulation. Compare 
Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1979) 
(emphasizing a political approach in conflict with an economic approach), with Daniel A. Crane, 
Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1160 (2008) (preferring a technocratic 
approach over a populist, democratic approach). 
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principle that limits the extent to which wrongful gains can be 
extracted from the market. 
Part I of this Article describes the dominant conception of Rule 
10b-5 as an antifraud rule meant to facilitate efficient markets. Part II 
describes the evolution of insider trading doctrine so that it now 
reflects an unjust enrichment principle. Part III describes how the 
unjust enrichment principle has increased the substantive reach of 
Rule 10b-5 in a number of contexts. Part IV relates to the tension 
between the efficient-markets and unjust-enrichment conceptions of 
Rule 10b-5 in the context of the scienter standard, which is evolving 
in such a way that it focuses more and more on individual enrichment. 
Part V argues that Rule 10b-5 is best seen as having two concerns, a 
first-order concern relating to efficient markets, and a second-order 
concern relating to unjust enrichment. It argues that the rise of the 
unjust enrichment principle illustrates that securities regulation does 
more than further economic goals: it also reflects public values. In a 
world in which the public is increasingly focused on wrongful 
enrichment by market participants, Rule 10b-5 should play an 
important though limited role in punishing the worst forms of unjust 
enrichment relating to securities transactions. 
I.  RULE 10B-5 AS AN ANTIFRAUD RULE 
As noted in the Introduction, securities regulation is centered on 
a truthful disclosure requirement,18 which is largely enforced through 
the antifraud provision set forth in Section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 193419 and implemented by Rule 10b-5.20 Because 
the SEC reviews only a small percentage of disclosures for accuracy 
and cannot verify most disclosed information,21 securities fraud 
actions brought pursuant to Rule 10b-5 are the main legal mechanism 
 
 18. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1977) (noting that the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 implements a “philosophy of full disclosure” (quoting 
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1971))); Easterbrook & Fischel, 
supra note 1, at 670 (“The dominating principle of securities regulation is that anyone willing to 
disclose the right things can sell or buy whatever he wants at whatever price the market will 
sustain.”); Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: 
Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 869–86 (2003) (describing the disclosure 
regime and its expansion). 
 19. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
 21. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., FINANCIAL 
OVERSIGHT OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 10 (Comm. Print 2002) 
(noting that the SEC reviewed about 16 percent of the filings it received in 2001). 
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for policing the accuracy of periodic filings and disclosures.22 This Part 
traces the initial evolution of the theory and doctrine defining the 
scope of Rule 10b-5 securities fraud actions. Although the initial goal 
of prohibiting fraud was the protection of investors, the mandatory 
disclosure and antifraud regime is now primarily justified as a means 
of enhancing the efficiency of markets. Many of the Supreme Court’s 
securities fraud decisions interpret Rule 10b-5 in a way that 
emphasizes the efficient-markets goal by narrowing the scope of 
securities fraud actions so that they mainly reach fraudulent 
statements that cause market distortions. 
A. Efficient Markets and Rule 10b-5 
In its early days, the primary goal of securities regulation was 
seen as protecting investors.23 For example, the few early empirical 
studies assessing mandatory disclosure asked whether disclosure 
resulted in greater returns for investors.24 Though investor protection 
still plays a significant role in securities regulation, the focus of 
protection has shifted from the investor to the market.25 These 
developments are partly a result of the incorporation of financial 
theory into both the legal literature and doctrine. The ideal of an 
efficient market set forth a new role for Rule 10b-5 as a protector of 
markets. 
 
 22. In addition, there are other provisions providing a remedy for fraud in particular 
circumstances, such as the issuance of securities. See Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) § 11, 
15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006). 
 23. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983) (“Defrauded 
investors are among the very individuals Congress sought to protect in the securities laws.”); 
Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities 
Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 336 (1979) (“[F]ew would disagree that the antifraud provisions 
tend to focus more on the role of protection than on the role of efficiency.”); Alan B. Levenson, 
The Role of the SEC as a Consumer Protection Agency, 27 BUS. LAW. 61, 61–62 (1971) (“If the 
Securities and Exchange Commission is to be viewed as a ‘consumer protection agency’ and, 
indeed, it was so designed by Congress, the consumers which it was designed to protect are the 
public investors.”); Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the 
Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (1977) (“The SEC, however, 
has come to perceive the primary purpose of the securities laws to be the protection of 
investors, rather than improved resource allocation.” (footnote omitted)). 
 24. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 19 BUS. LAW. 
721, 725 (1964) (“The basic test [of disclosure] is simplicity itself: how did investors fare before 
and after the S.E.C. was given control over the registration of new issues?”). 
 25. See, e.g., Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 66 (1980) (“Antifraud rules, such as rule 10b-5, are designed to reduce the transaction 
costs of exchange.”). 
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Beginning in the 1960s, financial economists hypothesized that 
stock markets were efficient in that a stock price reflects all known 
information relevant to the value of the stock.26 They produced 
evidence that stock prices followed an unpredictable random walk, 
indicating that a stock price reflects current information rather than 
being determined by patterns reflected in past stock prices.27 The 
efficient-markets hypothesis distinguished between weak, semi-
strong, and strong forms of efficiency.28 The weak form of efficiency 
contends that future stock prices cannot be predicted by studying past 
stock prices.29 The semi-strong form of efficiency contends that stock 
prices reflect all publicly available information about the issuer.30 The 
strong form of efficiency contends that stock prices reflect all 
information, whether publicly available or not, about the issuer.31 
Perhaps the first legal academic to extensively analyze securities 
regulation through the lens of the efficient-markets hypothesis was 
law and economics scholar Henry Manne. In an article following the 
1966 publication of his controversial defense of insider trading, 
Insider Trading and the Stock Market,32 Manne notes that he failed to 
appreciate in his book that the link between insider trading and 
market efficiency was the strongest argument for allowing insider 
trading.33 Manne argues that because insiders are in the best position 
 
 26. See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970) (reviewing a decade’s worth of empirical research on efficient 
capital markets and stating that “[a] market in which prices always ‘fully reflect’ available 
information is called ‘efficient’”). 
 27. See Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34, 34–35 (1965) 
(explaining that data suggest that the random-walk theory is correct in that successive prices are 
independent and the price changes conform to some probability distribution). 
 28. Fama, supra note 26, at 383; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reineir H. Kraakman, The 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 555 (1984) (“Eugene Fama’s landmark 
1970 review article first proposed the now-familiar division of the [Efficient Capital Market 
Hypothesis] into ‘weak,’ ‘semi-strong,’ and ‘strong’ forms as a device for classifying empirical 
tests of price behavior.”). 
 29. See Fama, supra note 26, at 383. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. 
 32. HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966). In his book, 
Manne primarily argues that insider trading does not hurt long-term investors, id. at 77–110, and 
that insider trading is a way of compensating entrepreneurs, id. at 111–58. 
 33. See Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. REV. 547, 
565 (1970) (“The efficient functioning of the stock market is actually one of the strongest 
arguments for unfettered insider trading, though at first blush it may appear to have little 
relationship to the issue at hand.”); see also Hsiu-Kwang Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 260, 266 (1968) (“Insider speculation 
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to assess the significance of new information that might impact a 
company’s stock price, insider trading would increase the speed at 
which market prices accurately reflected new information.34 
By 1968, the economist Irwin Friend could declare: “The 
economic justification for disclosure, which is perhaps the most basic 
mechanism of securities regulation, is the belief that the provision of 
information to prospective investors is a necessary condition for 
efficient markets.”35 Before long, the SEC and its critics were also 
citing the efficient-markets hypothesis. A 1977 report by the Advisory 
Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the SEC discussed the 
efficient-markets hypothesis as a justification for mandatory 
disclosure rules.36 In his 1979 book, The SEC and Corporate 
 
performs an important function in the stock market; it increases both allocational efficiency and 
promotional efficiency.”). 
 34. Manne, supra note 33, at 565–75. This conclusion has been questioned. Ronald Gilson 
and Reineir Kraakman note that trades by insiders in themselves may not transmit information 
to the market. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 28, at 629–31 (“Insiders trade because 
private information alters their expectations. But their trading will change the market’s 
expectations about the security, and hence its price, only if their private information is somehow 
transmitted to the market.”). 
 35. Irwin Friend, The SEC and the Economic Performance of Securities Markets, in 
ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 185, 187 (Henry G. 
Manne ed., 1969); see also George J. Benston, The Effectiveness and Effects of the SEC’s 
Accounting Disclosure Requirements, in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF 
CORPORATE SECURITIES, supra, at 23, 26 (“Perhaps one of the most important arguments for 
requiring that accounting statements be disclosed is that they convey information that is 
required for the stock market to be efficient.”); Levenson, supra note 23, at 62 (“The economic 
justification for disclosure as the keystone of investor protection lies in the belief that material 
corporate and financial information disseminated to prospective investors provides a rational 
basis to evaluate securities and this is a necessary precondition to efficient markets.”). 
 36. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., REP. OF 
THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SEC, 644–47 (Comm. Print 
1977). The report linked the disclosure system to the goal of creating efficient markets: “The 
system of corporate disclosure that emerged under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act can 
best be understood as one aspect of an essentially two-pronged regulatory approach that was 
designed to promote more efficient securities markets.” Id. at 560. 
  In addition, the move to an integrated disclosure system by the SEC assumes an 
efficient market. See, e.g., Proposed Comprehensive Revision to System for Registration of 
Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 6235, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,693, 63,698 (Sept. 2, 1980) 
(premising the shelf-registration mechanism on an assumption that “investors are protected by 
the market’s analysis of information about certain companies which is widely available, both 
from the Commission’s files and other sources, and that such analysis is reflected in the price of 
the securities offered”); SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE ’33 AND ’34 ACTS (THE WHEAT REPORT) 10, 48, 52, 
54 (1969) (emphasizing the role of sophisticated investors and professionals in filtering 
information and the speed at which dissemination occurs). 
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Disclosure: Regulation in Search of a Purpose,37 Homer Kripke takes a 
contrary view, using the efficient-markets hypothesis to critique the 
SEC’s disclosure system. Kripke notes that if markets are efficient, it 
is unlikely that an amateur investor can take advantage of disclosures 
to find an undervalued stock because the investor cannot move 
quickly enough to take advantage of the information before it is 
reflected in the stock price.38 Kripke also questions the importance of 
information summarizing past performance when stock prices are 
determined by future performance.39 He acknowledges, however, that 
the mandatory disclosure system should not be abandoned because 
past financial information can be useful in analyzing the fundamental 
value of a stock.40 
Scholars also began linking the Rule 10b-5 fraud prohibition to 
the needs of an efficient market.41 Victor Brudney noted in 1979 that 
the goal of an antifraud provision “is to improve the efficiency of the 
market so that the price reflects value, and therefore financial, and 
ultimately real, resources will be optimally allocated.”42 Gregg Jarrell 
has noted that fraud would increase the information risk faced by 
investors.43 Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel have observed that 
“[f]raud reduces allocative efficiency” and “[a]ccurate information is 
 
 37. HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH 
OF A PURPOSE (1979). 
 38. Id. at 86–87 (“[Efficient-market studies] point to a fundamental flaw in the SEC’s 
standard rhetoric that disclosure in its documents will enable the investor to make an informed 
judgment after he is appraised of all the facts. If a market layman or an unsophisticated market 
professional determined from those documents that a security were undervalued, he might or 
might not be wrong on the facts, but in any event he would be wrong on the timing.”). 
 39. Id. at 31–32. 
 40. Id. at 106–07. 
 41. In understanding the importance of the fraud prohibition, it makes sense to distinguish 
between informational and fundamental efficiency. See, e.g., William K.S. Wang, Some 
Arguments That the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341, 344–49 (1986) 
(defining informational efficiency as a state in which prices reflect all public information, 
whereas “fundamental-valuation” efficiency is a state in which “prices are based on the rational 
expectations of future payments to which the asset gives title”). A market is informationally 
efficient if stock prices quickly incorporate available information. A market is fundamentally 
efficient if stock prices accurately reflect the fundamental or true value of the stock. Mandatory 
disclosure may be enough if the only concern is informationally efficient markets. But if 
fundamental efficiency is the goal, a fraud prohibition is desirable to deter companies from 
issuing false information that hinders the ability of the market to reflect the fundamental value 
of the stock. To the extent that this Article refers to efficient markets, it is referring to markets 
that are fundamentally efficient. 
 42. See Brudney, supra note 23, at 334. 
 43. Gregg A. Jarrell, The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for New 
Security Issues, 24 J.L. & ECON. 613, 635 (1981). 
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necessary to ensure that money moves to those who can use it most 
effectively and that investors make optimal choices about the 
contents of their portfolios.”44 An antifraud rule could reduce 
verification costs and make it more costly for “low-quality firms to 
mimic high-quality ones by making false disclosures.”45 John Coffee 
cites empirical evidence that federal securities laws reduced price 
dispersion and notes that the “most logical conclusion to draw from 
this evidence is that allocative efficiency was enhanced and that 
investors thereby benefited.”46 
The theoretical link between Rule 10b-5 and efficient markets 
became embedded in doctrine with the Supreme Court’s 1988 
decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.47 In Basic Inc., the Court adopted a 
fraud-on-the-market theory,48 under which reliance on a fraudulent 
misstatement relating to a publicly-traded company could be 
presumed because, in an efficient market, a stock price would reflect 
that misstatement.49 The Court observed that “[r]ecent empirical 
studies have tended to confirm Congress’ premise that the market 
price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly 
available information, and hence, any material misrepresentations.”50 
The Court thus firmly linked Rule 10b-5 and its fraud prohibition to a 
particular goal: the prevention of misrepresentations that might 
distort an efficient market.51 
 
 44. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 673. 
 45. Id. at 677. 
 46. John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure 
System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 735–36 (1984). But see Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice 
of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763, 838–46 (1995) (arguing that antifraud liability 
might reduce incentives to disclose). 
 47. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 48. Lower courts had adopted the fraud-on-the-market theory as early as 1975. See, e.g., 
Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 907 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting that an investor who purchases 
stock on an exchange “relies generally on the supposition that the market price is validly set and 
that no unsuspected manipulation has artificially inflated the price, and thus indirectly on the 
truth of the representations underlying the stock price—whether he is aware of it or not, the 
price he pays reflects material misrepresentations”); see also Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern 
Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 BUS. LAW. 1, 9 
(1982) (discussing the fraud-on-the-market theory); Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 1143, 1154–56 (1982) (discussing the assumption that market prices respond to 
information that is or is not disseminated). 
 49. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 241–49. 
 50. Id. at 246. 
 51. The Supreme Court’s use of the efficient-markets hypothesis in Basic Inc. has been 
controversial. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad 
Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1060 (1990) 
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Although there has been controversy over whether markets are 
actually efficient,52 an antifraud rule that helps markets function 
efficiently rather than dictating behavior of public companies is a 
form of regulation attractive to those who do not typically favor 
regulation.53 Thus, the antifraud rule has largely been spared the 
extensive efficiency critiques that economists level at other regulatory 
areas such as antitrust.54 Scholars continue to defend securities 
regulation as an essential way of encouraging efficient markets.55 Rule 
 
(“[The Court’s adoption of the efficient capital markets hypothesis] suffers from analytic flaws 
that threaten to undermine its usefulness.”); Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of 
Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 623–25 (1992) (“[R]ejecting [fraud on the 
market] and requiring individualized proof of reliance as a prerequisite to recovery under Rule 
10b-5 would most closely approximate optimal deterrence.”). 
 52. See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market 
Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 857–72 (1992) (describing behavioral economics 
critiques of the market-efficiency theory); Wang, supra note 41, at 344–49 (describing arguments 
that markets are not fundamentally efficient); see also Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of 
Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 613, 618 (1989) (arguing that the goal of efficient markets may be less important 
than assumed because stock markets do not play a significant role in allocating resources). 
 53. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 669 (noting that “[t]here is very little 
substantive regulation of investments” under the disclosure regime). 
 54. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH 
ITSELF 104–06 (1978) (discussing the “thoroughly misunderstood concept” of productive 
efficiency). 
 55. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 229, 230 (2007) [hereinafter Coffee, Law and the Market] (“[H]igher enforcement 
intensity gives the U.S. economy a lower cost of capital and higher securities valuations.”); 
Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Frauds, Markets, and Fraud-on-the-Market: The Tortured 
Transition of Justifiable Reliance from Deceit to Securities Fraud, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 671, 675 
(1995) (“[F]raud-on-the-market is a desirable but incomplete development in securities fraud.”); 
Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE 
L.J. 711, 713 (2006) (“[T]he ultimate goal of securities regulation is to attain efficient financial 
markets . . . .”); see also Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” 
Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 979 (1992) (noting that the purpose of securities regulation is 
“to create stock markets in which the market price of a stock corresponds to its fundamental 
value”). 
  That is not to say there has not been controversy over the desirability of the current 
regime. Many have questioned whether the enforcement scheme is effective. See, e.g., John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its 
Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1535–36 (2006) [hereinafter Coffee, Reforming] 
(arguing that Rule 10b-5 actions fail to adequately deter individual managers). Critics have 
argued that firms should have more flexibility in choosing the degree of disclosure they give to 
investors. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the 
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 907 (1998) (recommending 
a regulatory regime that “focuses on regulatory competition and gives issuers and investors the 
ability to choose the law that governs their transactions”); Roberta Romano, Empowering 
Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2427 (1998) 
(suggesting that firms should be permitted to select their own securities regulators). 
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10b-5 is thus seen primarily as a rule that protects the efficiency of 
markets. 
B. Doctrinal Limits 
Consistent with the view that Rule 10b-5 primarily encourages 
efficient markets, courts for a time mostly interpreted Rule 10b-5 as a 
narrow antifraud rule. This is not surprising, as the text of all three 
subsections of Rule 10b-5 focuses on the existence of fraud.56 
Subsection (a) prohibits any “device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.”57 
Subsection (b) prohibits any “untrue statement of a material fact 
or . . . [failure] to state a material fact” necessary to make a statement 
not misleading.58 Subsection (c) prohibits “any act, practice, or course 
of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit.”59 
Although fraud is a notoriously broad concept and includes 
many types of misconduct,60 the Supreme Court has used a narrow 
conception of securities fraud in the context of Rule 10b-5 that is 
consistent with the view that the primary purpose of Rule 10b-5 is to 
promote efficient markets. This conception of Rule 10b-5 as an 
antifraud rule is defined by at least three essential elements.61 First, 
there must be a misrepresentation or omission.62 Second, the 
misrepresentation or omission must be material, that is, significant to 
the market or investors.63 Third, the material misrepresentation or 
omission must be “in connection with” a securities transaction.64 
The requirement of a misrepresentation or omission ensures that 
Rule 10b-5 is limited to disclosure-related conduct. Not all corporate 
misconduct qualifies. For example, in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. 
Green,65 the Supreme Court rejected a Rule 10b-5 claim brought by 
 
 56. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
 57. Id. § 240.10b-5(a) (emphasis added). 
 58. Id. § 240.10b-5(b). 
 59. Id. § 240.10b-5(c) (emphasis added). 
 60. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987) (defining fraud broadly as 
including “the act of embezzlement, which is the ‘fraudulent appropriation to one’s own use of 
the money or goods entrusted to one’s care by another’” (quoting Grin v. Shane, 187 U.S. 181, 
189 (1902))). 
 61. A complete list of the elements that must be alleged by a private plaintiff includes: (1) a 
material misrepresentation or omission, (2) scienter, (3) reliance, (4) causation, and (5) 
damages. See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 65. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
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minority shareholders who were unhappy with the terms of a 
proposed merger.66 The Second Circuit, in allowing the case to 
proceed, held that Rule 10b-5 could reach “breaches of fiduciary duty 
by a majority against minority shareholders without any charge of 
misrepresentation or lack of disclosure.”67 The Second Circuit found 
such a breach because the merger did not serve a proper business 
purpose and was effected without proper notice to the shareholders.68 
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that a breach of fiduciary duty 
could not be the basis of a Rule 10b-5 claim without some “deception, 
misrepresentation, or nondisclosure.”69 
In two decisions exemplifying this antifraud approach, the 
Supreme Court focused on the absence of a specific 
misrepresentation or omission in rejecting aiding and abetting liability 
for Rule 10b-5 claims. In Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank,70 the 
Court reasoned that an aiding and abetting defendant cannot be 
liable under Rule 10b-5 if it does not make a specific 
misrepresentation or omission on which the plaintiff relies.71 In 
Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,72 the Court 
again rejected secondary liability because investors did not directly 
rely on the secondary actor’s “acts or statements.”73 
In addition to the requirement that there be a misrepresentation 
or omission, the materiality requirement of Rule 10b-5 ensures that 
the misrepresentation or omission is relevant to the market. 
Materiality requires that “disclosure of the omitted fact would have 
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered 
the ‘total mix’ of information made available.”74 A company might 
deceive the market or investors with respect to trivial matters, but 
such conduct is not actionable under Rule 10b-5. It is only when a 
misrepresentation or omission affects the functioning of a market that 
the conduct triggers the antifraud rule. 
 
 66. Id. at 464–65, 475, 479–80. 
 67. Id. at 469–70. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 476. 
 70. Cent. Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 71. Id. at 180. 
 72. Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008). 
 73. Id. at 769–70. 
 74. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. 
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Finally, to fall within the scope of Rule 10b-5, the questioned 
conduct must be “in connection with” the purchase or sale of a 
security.75 Read in conjunction with the requirement that there be a 
misrepresentation that is material, the “in connection” requirement 
helps ensure that Rule 10b-5 does not cover conduct without a nexus 
to investors or the markets. Rather than regulating all misconduct 
that happens to relate to the securities industry, an antifraud reading 
of the “in connection” requirement directs Rule 10b-5 at conduct that 
hinders the ability of markets to price securities.76 
II.  RULE 10B-5, INSIDER TRADING, AND THE  
UNJUST ENRICHMENT PRINCIPLE 
Despite the theoretical and doctrinal power of the portrayal of 
Rule 10b-5 as an antifraud rule that promotes efficient markets, there 
is one area of Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence that is difficult to reconcile 
with that narrative. As discussed in this Part, the prohibition of 
insider trading by Rule 10b-5 fits uneasily with the view that Rule 
10b-5 is directed primarily at fraud. Although the classical theory of 
insider trading tried to conceptualize insider trading as a fraudulent 
failure to disclose by insiders, the Supreme Court’s adoption of the 
misappropriation theory in O’Hagan makes it clear that insider 
trading doctrine reflects an unjust enrichment principle. This Part 
describes how Rule 10b-5 evolved from a narrow focus on fraud to a 
broader focus on unjust enrichment through the development of 
insider trading doctrine. 
A. The Classical Theory of Insider Trading 
The quintessential example of insider trading involves an 
individual who has obtained important information about a company 
that is not available to the public. When that information becomes 
publicly known, the company’s stock price will move significantly 
higher (or lower). The individual can profit from such information by 
purchasing (or selling) the stock before the information is released. 
Rule 10b-5 has been the primary basis for prohibiting insider 
trading.77 As this Section shows, this prohibition has been criticized on 
 
 75. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
 76. For an early discussion of how courts interpreted the “in connection” requirement, see 
generally Barbara Black, The Second Circuit’s Approach to the “In Connection With” 
Requirement of Rule 10b-5, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 539 (1988). 
 77. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (prohibiting insider trading relating to tender offers). 
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two grounds: (1) insider trading does not harm investors and may 
even make markets more accurate, and (2) insider trading doctrine is 
not a fraud that fits within the scope of Rule 10b-5. 
1. The Efficient-Markets Critique of the Insider Trading 
Prohibition.  As discussed earlier, Henry Manne criticizes the insider 
trading prohibition on the ground that insider trading facilitates the 
transfer of information to efficient markets.78 Unlike the typical 
securities fraud case, in which a company misleads investors about its 
condition, causing them to purchase stock at inflated prices, it is 
difficult to trace just whom insider trading directly harms.79 And if 
insider trading makes markets operate more efficiently, the benefits 
of allowing insider trading might outweigh the harm. 
 
 78. See supra Part I.A; see also Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of 
Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 868 (1983) (reasoning that communicating information 
through insider trading gives firms power to control information contained in the share price). 
However, there is little empirical support for the market-efficiency argument. See Stephen 
Bainbridge, The Insider Trading Prohibition: A Legal and Economic Enigma, 38 U. FLA. L. 
REV. 35, 63–65 (1986) (noting the ambiguity of the evidence supporting the market-efficiency 
justification for insider trading); James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical 
Response to the “Chicago School,” 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 648 (“Manne’s thesis has no reliable 
support in either theory or empirical data.” (footnote omitted)). 
  Manne also argues that insider trading might be a way of compensating managers. See 
MANNE, supra note 32, at 111–58. A problem with such an arrangement might be that an 
executive compensated in this way would have an incentive to increase the volatility of the stock 
to exploit his access to inside information. See, e.g., Cox, supra, at 636–37 (discussing possible 
ways in which insiders might manipulate disclosures or corporate activities to benefit 
themselves); Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and 
the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 332 (“The opportunity to gain from 
insider trading also may induce managers to increase the volatility of the firm’s stock prices.”). 
 79. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 78, at 635 (“[T]he regulation of insider trading cannot be 
justified out of concern for protecting the unwary investor.”); Dooley, supra note 25, at 31 (“It is 
difficult, however, to draw a convincing, or even plausible, causal connection between the 
insider trading and the market losses experienced by other investors.”); Kimberly D. Krawiec, 
Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the 
Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 468 (2001) (“Despite the best efforts of scholars to 
prove otherwise, it has long been recognized that many investors are unaffected, or even 
benefited, by insider trading.”). 
  William Wang has set forth a novel theory of how investors can be harmed by insider 
trading. See William K.S. Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal 
Stock Markets: Who Is Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule 10b-5?, 54 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1217 (1981). According to Wang, “[w]ith a purchase of an existing issue of securities, 
someone ultimately requires more of that issue; with a sale of an existing issue, someone 
ultimately acquires more of that issue.” Id. at 1235. Wang acknowledges, however, that it is 
difficult to identify precisely which investors are harmed by insider trading. See id. at 1238 
(“[T]he Law of Conservation of Securities indicates that although an inside trade does harm 
specific individuals, identifying them is almost impossible.”). 
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One response to Manne’s argument has been that if insider 
trading is rampant, investors will not have confidence in the market 
and will fail to invest.80 Victor Brudney argues that the prohibition 
against insider trading is grounded on remedying unfair informational 
advantages.81 An insider who trades based on information that the 
public cannot access has an unfair advantage because “he has a lawful 
monopoly on access to the information involved.”82 To the extent that 
a trader, whether an insider or outsider, has an “informational 
advantage that the public is unable lawfully to overcome or offset,” it 
is unfair to allow the trader to exploit such an advantage.83 An insider 
trading prohibition remedies informational asymmetries, making 
investors feel comfortable that the markets are not stacked against 
them.84 
 
 80. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 23, at 356 (stating that a rational buyer will either refrain 
from dealing or demand a risk premium if he knows that the party with whom he is conducting 
business has a material advantage). 
 81. Id. at 338 (“The effort is to deny the possessor an informational advantage in trading 
with other investors more than to inform the latter about the state of the world in order to 
facilitate their investment decisions generally.”). 
 82. Id. at 346. Professor Saul Levmore also defines fairness with respect to insider trading 
broadly, arguing that “fairness is achieved when insiders and outsiders are in equal positions.” 
Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 
117, 122 (1982). 
  The asymmetry may even be more unjust because the insider has access to the 
information solely by reason of his position rather than because he does productive work in 
uncovering the information. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, 
and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13 (1978) (distinguishing between information 
that is deliberately found and information that is casually discovered). 
 83. Brudney, supra note 23, at 360. Of course, Brudney would not prohibit traders from 
exploiting lawful asymmetries of information. See id. at 361–63. 
 84. See id. at 357 (“[I]n its effort to restore faith in the securities market, Congress 
concluded that [insider] informational advantages should be denied.”). The Supreme Court in 
O’Hagan relied in part on Brudney’s conception of fairness in justifying the prohibition against 
insider trading. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 659 (1997) (citing Brudney, supra 
note 23, at 356). 
  The notion that insider trading is unfair is widespread. See, e.g., Dooley, supra note 25, 
at 43 (“Every argument in favor of regulating insider trading proceeds from the crucial assertion 
that it is such a deviation from generally accepted standards of conduct that it is morally 
wrong.”). As the SEC noted in Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 
40 SEC Docket 907 (Nov. 8, 1961), the prohibition against such trading is based in part on “the 
inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of [inside] information knowing it is 
unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.” Id. at 912. Justice Blackmun in particular 
subscribed to a fairness theory of insider trading. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 
248 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing in his dissent that insider trading is “inherently 
unfair”); see also Jill E. Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for Insider Trading 
Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 179, 233 (1991) (“The successful inside trader has won the lottery 
without buying a ticket.”). 
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A problem with the investor-confidence theory is that it is almost 
impossible to test empirically.85 Whereas the market impact of 
fraudulent information is commonly measurable by examining stock 
price movements after the fraud is admitted, there is not a 
comparable test for measuring the impact of insider trading on 
investor behavior. Moreover, if insider trading is done discreetly, the 
public may not perceive that the markets are stacked against them. 
As a result, it is difficult to link insider trading to a general lack of 
confidence in the markets. The investor-confidence case for 
prohibiting insider trading seems more tenuous than the case for 
prohibiting fraud. 
2. Insider Trading as Fraud?  In addition to the difficulty of 
justifying a ban on insider trading as necessary for efficient markets, 
many have questioned how insider trading can be considered a fraud 
prohibited by Rule 10b-5. It is difficult to say that an individual 
investor can defraud the market simply by purchasing or selling stock 
on the open market.86 No representation occurs when an investor 
makes the purchase.87 Even if the act of purchasing or selling stock 
can be read as a signal of what the investor believes the stock is 
worth, most such purchases are not large enough to significantly 
affect the market price of a publicly traded stock.88 
Rather than basing insider trading liability on an affirmative 
misrepresentation, the classical theory of insider trading bases the 
prohibition on a fraudulent failure to disclose. Fraud liability for 
 
 85. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 78, at 63–65 (describing the lack of empirical evidence 
about the impact of insider trading). 
 86. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 10, at 52 (“The open-market insider trading 
prohibition does not fit comfortably within the fraud and deception framework of section 10(b) 
and rule 10b-5.”); see also Easterbrook, supra note 78, at 318 (“A considerable distortion of 
language underlies any holding that trading in a market without issuing a press release is ‘fraud’ 
or ‘deceit.’”). But see Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider 
Trading Liability: A Post-O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1223, 1225 (1998) (arguing that 
investors are defrauded by insider trading). 
 87. See, e.g., Dooley, supra note 25, at 59 (“[I]nsider trading in no way resembles deceit. No 
representation is made, nor is there reliance, change of position, or causal connection between 
the defendant’s act and the plaintiff’s losses.”). 
 88. Of course, this assumes that the market does not infer the existence of inside 
information from the trades. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 78, at 635 (“The investor’s decision to sell 
or purchase is unaffected by whether the insider is also secretly buying or selling shares in the 
open market.”); Easterbrook, supra note 78, at 336 (“The insider’s trading thus may lead to 
price adjustments, but only to the extent the insider’s secret has leaked to the market or been 
inferred by traders.”). 
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nondisclosure can only attach when there is a duty to make a 
disclosure.89 Such a duty to disclose exists for directors and officers of 
a corporation who have a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their 
shareholders. As fiduciaries of the shareholders, directors and officers 
cannot profit at the expense of shareholders without disclosure.90 
Insider trading enriches directors at the expense of the shareholders 
with whom they trade. Rule 10b-5 has thus been read to subject 
insiders to what has been called the “disclose-or-abstain” rule.91 That 
is, an insider must either disclose any insider information or abstain 
from trading.92 
Thus, for a time, the courts linked securities fraud and fiduciary 
duty in the context of insider trading liability. Despite providing a 
convincing rationale for the prohibition, the incorporation of 
fiduciary duty concepts is in tension with the idea that Rule 10b-5 is 
primarily an antifraud rule. As the Supreme Court held in Santa Fe 
 
 89. As the Supreme Court has observed, “one who fails to disclose material information 
prior to the consummation of a transaction commits fraud only when he is under a duty to do 
so.” Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228. 
 90. Of course, the duty arguably does not extend to future shareholders, though it would 
be arbitrary to protect present shareholders while not protecting future shareholders. See, e.g., 
id. at 227 n.8 (noting that merely selling stock to an individual may create a fiduciary relation to 
the buyer). 
 91. The SEC was the first to recognize such a rule with respect to insiders. See In re Cady, 
Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 SEC Docket 907, 911 (Nov. 8, 1961) (“We, 
and the courts have consistently held that insiders must disclose material facts which are known 
to them by virtue of their position but which are not known to persons with whom they deal and 
which, if known, would affect their investment judgment.”). The courts soon followed. See, e.g., 
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 (“[J]udicial interpretations have established that silence in connection 
with the purchase or sale of securities may operate as a fraud actionable under § 10 (b) despite 
the absence of statutory language or legislative history specifically addressing the legality of 
nondisclosure.”); SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848–49 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) 
(“[A]nyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it . . . or . . . must 
abstain from trading in or recommending the securities . . . .”). 
  In addition, lawyers, accountants, and consultants to the company can be considered 
“constructive insiders” who are also subject to the disclose-or-abstain rule. See Dirks v. SEC, 
465 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983) (“The basis for recognizing [an outsider’s] fiduciary duty is . . . that 
they have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the 
enterprise and are given access to information solely for corporate purposes.”). 
 92. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997) (noting that under the 
classical theory of insider trading, Rule 10b-5 confers a duty to disclose inside information or 
abstain from trading); In re Refco Capital Mkts., Ltd. Brokerage Customer Sec. Litig., No. 06 
Civ. 643, 2007 WL 2694469, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2007) (“Another kind of securities fraud 
claim is based on conduct that is deceptive because it is inconsistent with a fiduciary duty. In 
claims of this kind, the fiduciary duty serves as a sort of standing false representation by the 
fraudster, who deceives the victim by violating the commitment associated with her fiduciary 
duty.”). 
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Industries, Inc. v. Green, a breach of a fiduciary duty by itself does not 
give rise to a cause of action under Rule 10b-5.93 Profiting at the 
expense of shareholders, although it violates fiduciary duties, does 
not necessarily affirmatively defraud those shareholders.94 On the 
other hand, covert trading on secret information by insiders can be 
characterized as deceptive, so it might be differentiated from the 
nondeceptive breach of fiduciary duty in Santa Fe Industries. 
Though insider trading involves an omission, such an omission is 
not material in the same sense in which a fraudulent statement or 
omission in the company’s financial statements can be material. 
Although inside information is material in that if it were revealed, the 
stock price would be altered, the act of trading on that information 
before it is revealed does not necessarily affect the stock price if the 
trading is discreet and modest in amount. Any deception by the 
insider relates to his particular duties to shareholders of the company 
rather than any broader duty to the market. Thus, it is difficult to 
argue that insider trading is like a fraud on the market. 
Even if the failure to disclose harms the market, one 
commentator notes that under current case law, an insider could 
theoretically remedy that deficiency by disclosing to the market that 
he will trade on inside information.95 Although it is unlikely that such 
candid insider trading would be implemented in practice, the 
argument demonstrates that fraud does not provide a complete 
explanation for why insider trading is wrong. If an insider can remedy 
the harm of nondisclosure by making a simple disclosure of the intent 
to trade on inside information, the prohibition seems trivial.96 Though 
the courts and the SEC claim to be simply applying the antifraud rule 
in promulgating a disclose-or-abstain rule, the reality is that the 
prohibition is at least partly motivated by other considerations.97 
 
 93. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977) (“[T]he cases do not 
support the proposition . . . that a breach of fiduciary duty by majority stockholders, without any 
deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure, violates the statute and the Rule.”). 
 94. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 84, at 192–94 (noting that a breach of fiduciary duty to 
shareholders is not necessarily deceptive). 
 95. See Prakash, supra note 10, at 1507 (“A careful examination of several cases and 
examples . . . help[s] prove the admittedly counterintuitive claim that Candid Insider Trading 
does not run afoul of Rule 10b-5.”). 
 96. See id. at 1516–17 (arguing that even a “modest disclosure” or “a one-time, blanket 
statement of intent to trade” might avoid the prohibition of deception). 
 97. See, e.g., WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 10, § 3:5.2 (“The public perception is that 
much stock market insider trading unjustly enriches the information possessor. This enrichment 
results from the trade rather than from the nondisclosure.”). 
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In addition, the classical theory allows for a substantial amount 
of trading on nonpublic information. If an individual is not a 
fiduciary, there is no fiduciary duty to disclose. In Chiarella v. United 
States, the Supreme Court reviewed the criminal conviction of a 
noninsider, Chiarella, who worked for a company that printed 
announcements of corporate takeover bids.98 Chiarella used 
information from the documents to trade in the companies that would 
be subject to such bids.99 Initially, Chiarella was convicted on a theory 
of fraudulent nondisclosure set forth in a jury charge that “permitted 
the jury to convict the petitioner if it found that he willfully failed to 
inform sellers of target company securities that he knew of a 
forthcoming takeover bid that would make their shares more 
valuable.”100 The Court overturned the conviction because Chiarella 
was not an officer or director of any of the companies whose stock he 
traded and thus had no duty of disclosure to the shareholders of those 
companies.101 
3. Unjust Enrichment as a Basis for the Insider Trading 
Prohibition.  Despite its focus on fiduciary duty, Chiarella also laid 
the foundation for an unjust enrichment rationale for prohibiting 
insider trading. In his Chiarella dissent, Chief Justice Warren Burger 
argued that Chiarella’s conduct should trigger liability because it 
“quite clearly serves no useful function except his own enrichment at 
the expense of others.”102 Burger thus urged the Court to adopt a 
misappropriation theory that would cover noninsiders.103 Soon after 
 
 98. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 226. 
 101. Id. at 231 (“Petitioner’s use of that information was not a fraud under § 10 (b) unless he 
was subject to an affirmative duty to disclose it before trading.”). 
 102. Id. at 241 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Langevoort, supra note 10, at 2 (“Persons 
in a position to have special access to confidential information bearing on the value of a security 
are perceived as being unjustly enriched when they trade with others who are unable to discover 
that information.”). 
 103. In a later case, Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), the Court used unjust enrichment 
language in determining when someone can be liable for receiving inside information from an 
insider. Such a receiver of information, or tippee, can only be liable for insider trading if the 
tipper breached a fiduciary duty to shareholders and the tippee knew or should have known of 
the breach. Id. at 660. To determine whether there is a fiduciary breach by the insider who 
passes on information, “the test is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or 
indirectly, from his disclosure.” Id. at 662. Thus, Dirks centers liability for disclosing insider 
information on a personal benefit gained by an insider—unjust enrichment. See, e.g., United 
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 663 (1997) (noting that there was no liability in Dirks because 
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the Court’s decision in Chiarella, a number of commentators argued 
that the insider trading prohibition could be rooted in an unjust 
enrichment principle.104 
A few years after Chiarella, Robert Thompson focused on the 
concept of restitution in making an unjust enrichment case against 
insider trading.105 Thompson explains that the scope of Rule 10b-5 can 
be better understood by distinguishing between “tort principles 
measuring harm to the plaintiff and unjust enrichment principles 
measuring gain to the defendant.”106 Thompson cites a notable First 
Circuit decision from 1965, Janigan v. Taylor,107 which couched its 
decision in a securities fraud case in unjust enrichment language, 
stating: “it is simple equity that a wrongdoer should disgorge his 
fraudulent enrichment.”108 Thompson noted that the prohibition of 
insider trading is better explained as an example of restitution rather 
than compensation.109 For insider trading cases, “the guiding principle 
 
“[t]he insiders had acted not for personal profit, but to expose a massive fraud within the 
corporation”). 
 104. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 10, at 26 (“After all, the primary justification for the 
abstain-or-disclose rule in open-market trading is avoidance of unjust enrichment . . . .”); 
Thompson, supra note 10, at 396 (“[T]he prohibition [against insider trading] is aimed at 
preventing insiders’ unjust enrichment.”). 
 105. See Thompson, supra note 10, at 397–98 (“Unjust enrichment as a separate theory of 
recovery . . . provides a better foundation to consider the more difficult problems raised in 
open-market insider trading cases.”). 
 106. Id. at 356. Restitution has long been recognized as a legitimate remedy for securities 
fraud. In its 1972 decision Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), the 
Supreme Court recognized that a plaintiff bringing a securities fraud action could argue for 
damages based on either the plaintiff’s loss or the defendant’s gain from the fraud. Id. at 154–55. 
If “the defendant received more than the seller’s actual loss,” the “damages are the amount of 
the defendant’s profit.” Id. at 155; see also Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 661–62 (1986) 
(recognizing a restitution remedy for Rule 10b-5 cases); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. 
Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611, 634 (1985) (“‘Injury’ and 
‘restitution’ are the competing paradigms of damages in securities law.”).  
  Restitution has often been linked to unjust enrichment. See, e.g., SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 
1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting in a Rule 10b-5 case that “restitution merely forces the 
defendant to give up to the trustee the amount by which he was unjustly enriched”); SEC v. 
Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc. 574 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Disgorgement of profits in an 
action brought by the SEC to enjoin violations of the securities laws appears to [be an equitable 
remedy]; the court is not awarding damages to which plaintiff is legally entitled but is exercising 
the chancellor’s discretion to prevent unjust enrichment.”); Peter B. Oh, Tracing, 80 TUL. L. 
REV. 849, 880 (2006) (noting that restitution can be a way of remedying unjust enrichment). 
 107. Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1965). 
 108. Id. at 786. 
 109. See Thompson, supra note 10, at 391–97 (arguing for the superiority of the restitution 
explanation in explaining the insider trading prohibition). Donald Langevoort has revived the 
possibility of using restitution as a means of securities fraud enforcement. Donald C. 
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is to make the defendant give back that which he obtained by 
invasion of the plaintiff’s interest whether or not that gain equals the 
plaintiff’s loss.”110 
Donald Langevoort, in analyzing the Chiarella decision, makes 
an unjust enrichment case against insider trading rooted in what he 
calls the fiduciary principle.111 Because insiders owe fiduciary duties of 
loyalty and disclosure to shareholders, Langevoort observes that 
“[r]equiring public disclosure by the insider in the open-market 
situation furthers a significant objective underlying the fiduciary 
disclosure rule—that of preventing unjust enrichment.”112 In analyzing 
whether insider trading outside of the insider context should be 
prohibited, Langevoort argues that “[a]s a matter of preventing unjust 
enrichment, . . . a duty to disclose is clearly called for when the 
information advantage derives from unlawful acquisition or use of the 
information.”113 
Chief Justice Burger and Professors Thompson and Langevoort 
all expressed the common-sense intuition that insider trading involves 
unjust enrichment.114 The problem, though, was reconciling an unjust 
enrichment view with doctrine that more and more viewed Rule 
 
Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked, Homeless and Without Wheels”: 
Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 630 (2007) (“[M]y attention in this Article is on equitable 
remedies—especially rescission and restitution—as underutilized tools in securities fraud 
enforcement.”). 
  Easterbrook and Fischel argue for an application of restitution that would limit Rule 
10b-5’s impact. They claim that restitution, rather than compensation measured by the market 
decline suffered by shareholders, is the optimal damages measure for securities fraud. In open-
market securities fraud cases, for every person who loses by buying stock inflated by fraud there 
is a person who gains by selling stock inflated by fraud, so the gains and losses from securities 
fraud cancel each other out. Thus, damages that measure the net harm to investors may not be 
meaningful. Instead, the optimal damages may be some measure of the profits captured by the 
person perpetrating the fraud—in other words, restitution. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 
106, at 634, 641–42. 
 110. Thompson, supra note 10, at 393. 
 111. Langevoort, supra note 10, at 19. 
 112. Id.; see also Gareth Jones, Unjust Enrichment and the Fiduciary’s Duty of Loyalty, 84 
LAW Q. REV. 472, 476 (1968) (“[I]t is all too evident that the dishonest fiduciary has been 
unjustly enriched. . . . [H]e has received a benefit (his profit), . . . gained it at his principal’s 
expense (by exploiting his position of trust), and . . . it would be unjust to allow him to retain that 
benefit.”). 
 113. Langevoort, supra note 10, at 52. 
 114. The intuition that insider trading is immoral is longstanding. See MANNE, supra note 
32, at 3 (“The absence of any accepted economic tools for analyzing this subject made the 
insider-trading area a fertile one for the lawyers’ equity approach with its overtones of fairness 
and morality.”). 
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10b-5 as an antifraud rule. Despite its intuitive appeal, the argument 
that an unjust enrichment principle explained the insider trading 
prohibition had an uncertain status for almost twenty years. 
B. The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading: Triumph of the 
Unjust Enrichment Principle 
Chiarella’s adoption of the classical theory of insider trading 
would leave a significant amount of insider trading unregulated. If 
insider trading is viewed solely as a fraud, it might only cover insiders 
with special fiduciary duties, leaving uncovered those who profit from 
misappropriated information but have no fiduciary relationship to the 
company’s shareholders. As this Section describes, in United States v. 
O’Hagan, the Supreme Court extended the prohibition beyond 
fiduciary relationships to cover misappropriators lacking a fiduciary 
duty to the traded company’s shareholders, moving the Rule 10b-5 
prohibition against insider trading further from the antifraud rule and 
closer to the unjust enrichment principle. 
1. United States v. O’Hagan.  O’Hagan was a case involving an 
inside trader who did not owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of 
the corporation whose stock he traded. O’Hagan was an attorney for 
a firm that represented an acquirer of another company.115 Although 
O’Hagan and his firm owed a duty to the acquirer, O’Hagan owed no 
fiduciary duty to the target company, and he traded on inside 
information relating to the target.116 In affirming the conviction of 
O’Hagan for insider trading, the Supreme Court adopted what it 
called the misappropriation theory,117 which was “designed to 
‘protec[t] the integrity of the securities markets against abuses by 
outsiders.’”118 
Under the misappropriation theory, a noninsider is liable for 
insider trading if he misappropriates information from a source to 
which he owes some duty of confidentiality. Rather than “premising 
 
 115. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997). 
 116. See id. (describing O’Hagan’s role at his law firm and illustrating that he had no role in 
the negotiations or with the target company). 
 117. Id. at 653–54 (“We agree with the Government that misappropriation . . . satisfies 
§ 10(b)’s requirement that chargeable conduct involve a ‘deceptive device or contrivance’ used 
‘in connection with’ the purchase or sale of securities.”). 
 118. Id. at 653 (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for the United States at 14, United 
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (No. 96-842), 1997 WL 86306) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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liability on a fiduciary relationship between company insider and 
purchaser or seller of the company’s stock, the misappropriation 
theory premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of 
those who entrusted him with access to confidential information.”119 
O’Hagan violated this rule because he deceived the source of the 
information, his law firm, to which he owed a duty of 
confidentiality.120 
O’Hagan is unclear with respect to the source and scope of this 
duty of nondeception. Indeed, the Court was unclear about what to 
call the duty, introducing the term “agency” as an additional 
descriptor of the type of relationship that could trigger insider trading 
obligations.121 For example, the Court cited to the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency relating to an “agent’s disclosure obligation 
regarding use of confidential information.”122 Though O’Hagan was a 
partner with fiduciary duties to his other partners,123 and the Court at 
times uses the language of fiduciary duty,124 the Court also stated that 
liability would be appropriate for a mere employee of the Wall Street 
Journal.125 Thus, the misappropriation theory appears to range wider 
than fiduciary relationships to shareholders, extending to any 
principal-agent relationship in which information is conveyed with an 
expectation of confidentiality.126 
2. Misappropriation as a Departure from the Antifraud 
Conception of Rule 10b-5.  By broadening Rule 10b-5 to encompass 
 
 119. Id. at 652. 
 120. See id. at 653 (approving the government’s misappropriation theory set forth in the 
indictment, which alleged “that O’Hagan, in breach of a duty of trust and confidence he owed to 
his law firm, Dorsey & Whitney, and to its client, Grand Met, traded on the basis of nonpublic 
information”). 
 121. See, e.g., id. at 661 (referring to a lack of “agency or other fiduciary relationship”). 
 122. Id. at 654–55 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 390, 395 (1958)). 
 123. Id. at 647, 653 (noting that O’Hagan was a partner at Dorsey & Whitney and owed the 
firm a “duty of trust and confidence”). 
 124. Id. at 647, 652, 655 (discussing § 10(b) violations as “breach[es] of a fiduciary duty,” 
“breach[es] of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality,” and “breach[es] of a duty of loyalty”). 
 125. See id. at 654 (citing with approval the imposition of liability for misappropriation in 
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987)). 
 126. See A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O’Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell’s Legacy 
for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 15 (1998) (“The Court’s decision in O’Hagan 
breaks new ground in establishing a foundation for insider trading based on common law agency 
principles, thereby departing from Powell’s vision of the scope of insider trading prohibited by 
§10(b).”); see also Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary 
Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1340–46 (2009) (documenting the trend of courts finding 
insider trading in the absence of fiduciary duty post-O’Hagan). 
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agency relationships other than the fiduciary relationship between 
insiders and shareholders, the misappropriation theory runs further 
from an antifraud and efficient-markets conception of Rule 10b-5.127 
Although the classical theory could purport to ground the prohibition 
in a duty to disclose owed to shareholders, the duty at stake in 
O’Hagan was a duty to a law firm. A law firm is not a direct market 
participant and certainly cannot be said to be the market. In contrast 
to the typical fraud-on-the-market case, in which there is a direct link 
between a deception and the market, a misappropriation insider-
trading case involves conduct that has at best a tenuous link to the 
market. 
Though the Court attempted to frame the misappropriation 
theory as fraud by noting that “[d]eception through nondisclosure is 
central to the theory of liability,”128 the deception by a 
misappropriator is of a different kind than a typical fraudulent 
nondisclosure relating to a security that harms investors. As many 
commentators have noted, the deception in a misappropriation case is 
directed at the source of the information rather than at the market.129 
The O’Hagan Court read the requirement that a deception be “in 
connection with” a securities transaction broadly, noting that the 
phase does not require “deception of an identifiable purchaser or 
seller.”130 Rather than requiring the deception to be directed at the 
 
 127. The Supreme Court acknowledged that disclosure would eliminate any element of 
fraud with respect to a misappropriation. Under O’Hagan, “full disclosure forecloses liability 
under the misappropriation theory,” O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655, implying that candid insider 
trading is permissible. Indeed, the Court states that an agent could avoid Rule 10b-5 liability by 
disclosing his intent to trade on insider information to the principal. Id.; see also Prakash, supra 
note 10, at 1510–16 (observing that O’Hagan appears to allow for candid insider trading). 
 128. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654. 
 129. See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, Kimberley D. Krawiec & Cynthia A. Williams, Don’t 
Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v. O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153, 190 (1998) 
(noting that misappropriation theory “turns not on effects on the marketplace or on potential 
damage to selling or purchasing shareholders, but rather on a duty owed to the source of the 
information, regardless of whether that source is a buyer or seller of securities”); Prakash, supra 
note 10, at 1533 (noting that after O’Hagan “Rule 10b-5 now regulates deceptions of parties 
unconnected to the securities markets”); Pritchard, supra note 126, at 44 (“[T]here is no 
principled way to limit the misappropriation theory to market participants.”). 
 130. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658. This language is consistent with an earlier case in which the 
Court made it clear that Section 10(b) “is not limited to preserving the integrity of the securities 
markets.” Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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market or investors, O’Hagan only requires that the deception 
“coincide” with a particular securities transaction.131 
The Supreme Court in O’Hagan also rejected a narrow reading 
of its decision in Central Bank, which the lower appeals court had 
read as imposing a requirement that a Rule 10b-5 claim be based on a 
specific misrepresentation or omission relied upon by investors.132 The 
Court found that there was no such requirement and that its rejection 
of aiding and abetting liability in Central Bank was based primarily on 
“policy considerations.”133 In clarifying that Rule 10b-5 does not 
require a specific misrepresentation or omission, the Court rejected a 
strict antifraud conception of Rule 10b-5 and set the foundation for 
unjust enrichment claims based on a broader range of deceptive 
conduct. 
In addition to an agency theory, O’Hagan also seems to base the 
insider trading prohibition on a property-rights theory.134 The 
 
 131. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 656 (“The securities transaction and the breach of duty thus 
coincide.”). 
 132. Id. at 664 (“The Eighth Circuit isolated the [Court’s] statement . . . and drew from it the 
conclusion that § 10(b) covers only deceptive statements or omissions on which purchasers and 
sellers, and perhaps other market participants, rely. It is evident . . . , however, that this 
Court . . . sought only to clarify that secondary actors, although not subject to aiding and 
abetting liability, remain subject to primary liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for certain 
conduct.” (citation omitted)); see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. 
Ct. 761, 769 (2008) (“If this conclusion were read to suggest there must be a specific oral or 
written statement before there could be liability under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, it would be 
erroneous.”). 
 133. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 664–65 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 
U.S. 723, 737 (1975)). 
 134. The idea that insider trading may violate the property rights of the corporation dates 
back to at least the 1920s. See, e.g., A.A. Berle, Jr., Publicity of Accounts and Directors’ 
Purchases of Stock, 25 MICH. L. REV. 827, 828 (1927) (noting the theory that “the detailed 
information of a director was the property of the corporation, and could not be used for his own 
benefit”). Modern scholars have often made this argument as well. See, e.g., Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider Trading 
Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1252–57 (1995) (arguing that federal insider-trading 
law protects the exclusive rights of a corporation to nonpublic information); Carlton & Fischel, 
supra note 78, at 865–66 (relying on “[t]he notion that the dispute concerning insider trading is 
really a dispute about which party more highly values a property right”); Krawiec, supra note 
79, at 449 (“The recognition that many of the fundamental issues in securities regulation 
essentially reduce to a matter of allocating property rights in valuable information is one of the 
greatest contributions of law and economics scholars to the securities law literature in recent 
years.”); Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against 
Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 11 (1984) (“[P]rivileged corporate information is a 
valuable asset in the nature of a property interest.”); Richard J. Morgan, Insider Trading and the 
Infringement of Property Rights, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 79, 80 (1987) (describing “inside information 
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O’Hagan Court observed that “[a] company’s confidential 
information . . . qualifies as property to which the company has a right 
of exclusive use.”135 A property-rights theory would be a clear break 
from an antifraud approach to Rule 10b-5. The property-rights theory 
does not hinge upon whether someone has been misled, but instead 
implies that any unauthorized use of property would trigger 
liability.136 Though the misappropriation of property can also be 
fraudulent (an individual can take property through a 
misrepresentation), such misappropriation does not have to involve 
an affirmative misrepresentation or omission: the property is simply 
taken. 
If inside information is viewed as a theft of corporate property, 
the scope of the insider trading prohibition might be both expanded 
and narrowed. It would be expanded because the prohibition would 
not be conditioned on the existence of a fiduciary or agency 
relationship.137 On the other hand, if inside information is the 
property of the corporation, nothing prevents corporations from 
contracting with insiders to allow them to trade on nonpublic 
information, thus narrowing the reach of the insider trading 
prohibition.138 But given the unlikelihood that insider trading would 
 
as property that can be owned and used by or for the benefit of the owner or creator of that 
property”). 
 135. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654 (citing Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25–27 (1987)). 
The SEC opinion introducing the federal prohibition of insider trading, In re Cady, Roberts & 
Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 40 SEC Docket 907 (Nov. 8, 1961), can be understood in 
part as advancing a “business property” theory. The prohibition arises in part from “the 
existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.” Id. at 912; 
see also Easterbrook, supra note 78, at 321 (noting that Cady, Roberts & Co. is rooted partly in 
the “business property” theory). 
 136. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 134, at 101 (“All that the plaintiff must establish is that he 
or she owned (or had rights in) the information, that those ownership or other rights were 
infringed by the defendant, and that the plaintiff suffered damage.”). 
 137. See, e.g., Nagy, supra note 126, at 1340–44 (describing cases in which misappropriation 
theory has been extended to thefts of inside information by individuals without connection to 
the corporation). 
 138. For some critics, the possibility of authorizing insider trading by contracting is a 
problem of the property-rights theory. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 84, at 225–26 (“[V]iewing 
inside information as property justifies treating the misappropriation of that property as theft 
but correspondingly requires the government to defer to firm decisions contractually allocating 
the entitlement to that property.”). For proponents of the theory, the property-rights theory is 
attractive for the very same reason. See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, supra note 78, at 866–72 
(describing reasons why corporations might want to contract with managers to allow insider 
trading); David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1449, 1467–68 (1987) (arguing that corporations should be permitted to opt out of 
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be widely authorized,139 on balance, a property-rights theory would 
prohibit a broader range of conduct than the classical theory. 
C. Elements of the Unjust Enrichment Principle 
By regulating deceptions that run afoul of agency duties or 
infringe on the property rights of the corporation, the Supreme Court 
has created a second broad category of concern for Rule 10b-5: cases 
of unjust enrichment. The fiduciary-duty, agency, and property-rights 
theories all have elements that allude to the unjust enrichment 
principle. As Langevoort notes in commenting on Chiarella, when a 
fiduciary trades on inside information, his failure to disclose is unjust 
enrichment.140 Similarly, an agency theory might couch the wrong 
more broadly as an agent profiting from access to information at the 
expense of the principal.141 The property-rights theory formulates the 
wrong as enriching oneself by misappropriating information that 
belongs to the corporation.142 
At the same time, after O’Hagan, the unjust enrichment 
principle captures the prohibition against insider trading better than 
any of these three concepts alone. Fiduciary duty does not cover the 
conduct of outsiders, which O’Hagan partly covers through agency 
law.143 Agency theory would not include misappropriations of 
 
insider trading prohibitions to contract with risk-taking managers); Krawiec, supra note 79, at 
498–99 (proposing that insider trading by outsiders should be regulated primarily by private 
enforcement of contract law). 
 139. As a practical matter, it is unlikely that corporations would be willing to permit their 
managers to trade in a way that hurts their shareholders. See, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 126, at 
46 (stating reasons why corporations are unlikely to allow insider trading). In addition, allowing 
parties to contract with respect to insider trading is problematic because it is difficult to assess 
the costs and benefits of allowing insiders to trade. E.g., Cox, supra note 78, at 653–55. 
 140. Langevoort, supra note 10, at 6–27; see also Elliot J. Weiss, United States v. O’Hagan: 
Pragmatism Returns to the Law of Insider Trading, 23 J. CORP. L. 395, 398–400 (1998) (citing 
common law cases prohibiting insider trading as unjust enrichment by a fiduciary). 
 141. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 84, at 190 (“[A]gency law suggests that a corporate insider is 
unjustly enriched by making use of corporate information for his personal benefit and that any 
trading profits are rightfully the property of the owner of the information—the corporation. 
This unjust enrichment takes place . . . whether or not the insider discloses the information prior 
to trading.”). 
 142. See, e.g., Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the 
Appropriation of Property or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 504, 509 (1980) 
(“[R]estitution may be justified on the general principle that a person who obtains—though not 
necessarily tortiously—a benefit at the expense of another through appropriation of a property 
or quasi-property interest held by the other person is unjustly enriched and should be liable to 
the other for any benefit attributable to the appropriation.”). 
 143. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654–55 (1997). 
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property by nonagents that would be actionable under a property-
rights theory. 
Although the property-rights theory is broadly inclusive, it does 
not explain the insider trading prohibition after O’Hagan as well as 
the unjust enrichment principle. There are difficulties with thinking of 
Rule 10b-5 as a property rights rule. Even if inside information is 
property, Rule 10b-5 does not regulate all of its uses. The theft of 
inside information alone would not trigger Rule 10b-5. Such a theft 
would likely only be covered by state law. The thief must trade on the 
inside information for profit to trigger Rule 10b-5.144 In other words, it 
is the enrichment that matters most, not the taking of the inside 
information. If Rule 10b-5 were truly a property rights rule, it would 
also cover the theft of inside information.145 
The idea of insider trading as unjust enrichment has been 
controversial.146 Even outside the securities law context, unjust 
enrichment has a shaky existence because of its vagueness.147 A 
number of commentators have highlighted the fact that unjust 
enrichment has not received the same attention as other more clearly 
defined torts.148 It is common to think of unjust enrichment as a 
substantive basis for liability,149 but the substance of the principle is 
 
 144. See, e.g., id. at 656 (“[T]he fiduciary’s fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary 
gains the confidential information, but when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses the 
information to purchase or sell securities.”). 
 145. Some might characterize unjust enrichment as simply a fairness argument. Although 
the unjust enrichment principle is a type of fairness argument, it is a specific type of fairness 
argument that focuses particularly on personal enrichment. 
 146. See Strudler & Orts, supra note 3, at 375–76 & n.4 (discussing the “struggle[s]” of 
“[c]ourts and commentators” to form a “coherent answer” for why insider trading is wrong); see 
also id. at 404–08 (discussing the merits of using unjust enrichment to explain why insider 
trading is wrong). 
 147. See, e.g., Friedmann, supra note 142, at 504 (“[Unjust enrichment] has on occasion been 
regarded as too indefinite and vague to be recognized as a general legal principle, with concern 
expressed that its adoption might undermine legal stability, confuse legal thinking, and 
jeopardize clear, systematic organization of the law.” (footnote omitted)); Emily Sherwin, 
Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 2083, 
2106–07 (2001) (“[W]hat makes unjust enrichment both powerful and dangerous when 
interpreted as a legal principle is its open-endedness.”). 
 148. See, e.g., Michael Heller & Christopher Serkin, Revaluing Restitution: From the Talmud 
to Postsocialism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1385 (1999) (“Whatever happened to the study of 
restitution?”); Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 
1277, 1277 (1989) (“Despite its importance, restitution is a relatively neglected and 
underdeveloped part of the law.”). 
 149. See, e.g., 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 552 (2d ed. 1993) (“Unjust enrichment 
has both a substantive and a remedial aspect.”); Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful 
Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1767, 1779–81 (2001) (arguing that unjust enrichment can support 
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vague.150 The Restatement of Restitution, which refers to the principle 
of unjust enrichment, declines to define it, referring to it as a “term of 
art” and simply stating that “[a] person who has been unjustly 
enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to 
the other.”151 
Regardless of its questionable pedigree in other legal contexts, 
after O’Hagan, the contours of a substantive unjust enrichment 
principle rooted in Rule 10b-5 have begun to emerge. First, rather 
than requiring a specific misrepresentation or omission directed at the 
market or investors, an unjust enrichment principle covers broader 
forms of deceptive conduct, such as misappropriation, that are not 
necessarily directed at the market or investors.152 Second, the unjust 
enrichment principle is not limited to conduct that directly harms the 
market but also covers conduct with a more tenuous connection to a 
securities transaction.153 Third, the unjust enrichment principle focuses 
primarily on benefits wrongfully extracted by the defendant at the 
expense of others.154 
 
“a right to restitution”); James J. Edelman, Unjust Enrichment, Restitution, and Wrongs, 79 TEX. 
L. REV. 1869, 1869 (2001) (“‘[R]estitution’ should be a term that refers only to a particular 
remedy, and ‘unjust enrichment’ should be a phrase that describes a particular group of 
actionable causes, none of which is a wrong.”); Friedmann, supra note 142, at 510 (“Recognition 
of this right [to restitution arising from unjust enrichment] is not dependent upon a showing that 
the appropriation was tortious . . . .”); Laycock, supra note 148, at 1284 (“Defendant may be 
unjustly enriched without having committed any other civil wrong.”). But see Andrew Kull, 
Rationalizing Restitution, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1222–23 (1995) (arguing that restitution 
should not be viewed as a remedial option, because it can be an independent basis for liability). 
 150. See, e.g., 1 DOBBS, supra note 149, at 557 (noting that the substantive unjust enrichment 
principle “cannot be precisely defined, and for that very reason has potential for resolving new 
problems in striking ways”). 
 151. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937). The Restatement is being revised, but the 
most recent draft retains this definition of unjust enrichment. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (Discussion Draft 2000). 
 152. This Article uses the words “deceptive” or “deception” to identify a broader form of 
misconduct that supports an unjust enrichment claim than the typical misrepresentation or 
omission necessary for an antifraud claim. One way of understanding the admittedly thin 
distinction between a deception, on the one hand, and a misrepresentation or omission, on the 
other, is that a deception often involves a course of conduct as opposed to the use of a particular 
statement to effectuate the fraud. 
 153. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 656 (1997) (“The securities transaction and 
the breach of duty thus coincide. This is so even though the person or entity defrauded is not the 
other party to the trade, but is, instead, the source of the nonpublic information.”). 
 154. The obvious remedy for insider trading is the disgorgement of gains or payment of a 
penalty by the trader. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. 
L. No. 100-704, § 5, 102 Stat. 4677, 4680–81 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (2006)); Dooley, supra 
note 25, at 14 (“Disgorgement of profits is an increasingly common remedy.”). The remedy 
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Broken into three simple elements, the unjust enrichment 
principle applies to (1) deceptive conduct (2) coinciding with a 
securities transaction (3) that enriches some individual at the expense 
of others. 
III.  UNJUST ENRICHMENT AS AN EXPANSIVE PRINCIPLE 
In O’Hagan, the Supreme Court legitimized the unjust 
enrichment principle as a substantive basis for liability under Rule 
10b-5. This Part describes how, subsequent to O’Hagan, the unjust 
enrichment principle has expanded the reach of Rule 10b-5 in the 
areas of (1) qualitative materiality, (2) broker-dealer 
misappropriation, (3) mutual-fund market timing, and (4) stock 
option backdating. Although other academics have examined aspects 
of these areas in isolation, this Article is the first to note how they are 
tied together by the common thread of unjust enrichment. 
A. Qualitative Materiality 
As this Section will show, the unjust enrichment principle has 
played a substantial role in shaping the requirement that a 
misstatement be material for it to trigger liability for securities 
fraud.155 In particular, the SEC has increasingly relied upon evidence 
of personal enrichment in determining whether financial 
misstatements meet the materiality threshold for triggering Rule 
10b-5. 
As noted earlier, the materiality standard is a key gatekeeper 
that works by distinguishing important misstatements that affect 
markets and investor decisions from trivial misstatements that do not. 
Prior to 1999, misstatements relating to a company’s financial 
statements were arguably subject to a quantitative test—to be 
material, the misstatement had to exceed 5 percent of net income.156 
 
reflects the nature of the legal obligation. The insider trading prohibition is concerned with the 
unjust enrichment by inside traders rather than direct harm to the market. 
 155. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 238 (1988) (“[I]n order to prevail on a Rule 
10b-5 claim, a plaintiff must show that the statements were misleading as to a material fact. It is 
not enough that a statement is false or incomplete, if the misrepresented fact is otherwise 
insignificant.”). 
 156. See, e.g., COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 128 (2006) available at http://
www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf (“For many years, the 
rule of thumb was that, in determining the scope of an audit, a potential error exceeding five 
percent of annual pre-tax income would be considered material. In evaluating a misstatement, 
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Misstatements below that 5 percent threshold were not material and 
would not trigger liability for securities fraud. 
A quantitative materiality standard is consistent with the view 
that Rule 10b-5 primarily serves to encourage efficient markets. The 
rationale for a quantitative standard is that misstatements below the 5 
percent threshold are unlikely to substantially affect the market’s 
assessment of a stock. By limiting liability to quantitatively large 
misstatements, the quantitative standard focuses Rule 10b-5 on 
misstatements that distort the ability of the market to accurately price 
securities. 
In 1999, the SEC issued Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 (SAB 
No. 99),157 which instructs that the materiality of financial 
misstatements should be assessed using a qualitative rather than a 
quantitative test. Under a qualitative test, a misstatement below the 5 
percent quantitative threshold can be material under certain 
circumstances.158 For example, a quantitatively small misstatement can 
be material if it leads to financial results that meet earnings targets or 
criteria for awarding management bonuses.159 SAB No. 99 has thus 
broadened the scope of misstatements that could trigger liability 
under Rule 10b-5. 
One rationale for SAB No. 99 is consistent with an efficient-
markets reading of Rule 10b-5. Even small misstatements can mask 
developments that are significant to the market. A small shortfall in 
earnings might signal larger shortfalls to come. On the other hand, 
SAB No. 99 can also be seen as motivated by the unjust enrichment 
 
an error that exceeded ten percent of pre-tax income was considered material, while the 
materiality of an error between five percent and ten percent of pre-tax income was assessed[] 
based on various qualitative factors.”); Matthew J. Barrett, The SEC and Accounting, In Part 
Through the Eyes of Pacioli, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837, 874 (2005) (“As a general rule, 
accountants and auditors usually treat any amount which does not exceed five percent of 
income before taxes as immaterial.”); Joseph A. Grundfest & Stephen E. Bochner, Fixing 404, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 1643, 1662 (2007) (noting the commonality of the 5 percent net-income 
standard); Glenn F. Miller, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99: Another Ill-Advised Foray into the 
Murky World of Qualitative Materiality, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 361, 363 (2000) (“A numerical rule 
of thumb has emerged: misstatements that impact disclosure by less than five percent are not 
material.”); Edward A. Weinstein, Materiality: Whose Business Is It?, 77 C.P.A. J. 24, 26 (2007) 
(“Although the professional literature never explicitly defined a ‘normal’ materiality limit, many 
auditors considered it to be 5% of net income.”). 
 157. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 19, 1999). 
 158. Id. at 45,151. 
 159. Id. Other qualitative considerations include whether the misstatement concerns a 
significant segment of the company’s business, affects regulatory compliance, affects the 
company’s ability to comply with loan covenants, or conceals an unlawful transaction. See id. 
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principle. Small misstatements may simply prevent fluctuations 
caused by the market’s overreaction to minor earnings shortfalls that 
should not significantly affect the long-term valuation of the stock. 
The motivation for these misstatements might be to allow insiders to 
sell stock at favorable prices. By targeting this manipulation, SAB 
No. 99 expresses a concern distinct from that of enabling efficient 
markets: the concern that certain individuals may be unjustly 
enriched through securities transactions. 
B. Broker-Dealer Misappropriation 
The unjust enrichment principle set forth in O’Hagan has been 
the explicit basis for at least one extension of Rule 10b-5 by the 
Supreme Court. As this Section discusses, the Court cited O’Hagan in 
applying Rule 10b-5 to cover brokers who misappropriate client 
funds. 
In the 2002 case SEC v. Zandford,160 the Supreme Court upheld a 
Rule 10b-5 claim against a broker who stole funds from a 
discretionary account he managed for a client.161 Though such theft 
does not involve a misrepresentation to the market or an investor 
concerning a particular security,162 the Court relied upon concepts of 
fiduciary duty in finding Rule 10b-5 liability. Because the broker 
failed to disclose the theft to the customer,163 he breached a fiduciary 
duty of loyalty to the customer, thus acting deceptively under Rule 
10b-5.164 Although the deception did not occur with respect to the 
purchase or sale of a particular security, the funds would have been 
used to purchase securities, so the Court cited O’Hagan in finding 
 
 160. SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813 (2002). 
 161. Id. at 815–16. 
 162. See, e.g., id. at 820 (“[N]either the SEC nor this Court has ever held that there must be 
a misrepresentation about the value of a particular security in order to run afoul of the Act.”). 
Rule 10b-5 has long been understood by courts to prohibit certain deceptive acts by brokers 
directed at their customers, such as unauthorized trading and churning (excessive trading in an 
account). See, e.g., Caiola v. Citibank, 295 F.3d 312, 323–24 (2d Cir. 2002) (listing cases and 
situations in which Rule 10b-5 would apply). However, Zandford is the first Supreme Court 
decision that can be linked to the unjust enrichment framework set forth by O’Hagan. 
 163. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 823 (“[A]ny distinction between omissions and 
misrepresentations is illusory in the context of a broker who has a fiduciary duty to her 
clients.”). 
 164. Zandford must be reconciled with the Court’s earlier statement in Santa Fe that a 
breach of fiduciary duty alone cannot sustain a Rule 10b-5 claim. See supra note 93. The 
difference is that there was a deceptive nondisclosure in Zandford, whereas there was no 
allegation of a misrepresentation or nondisclosure in Santa Fe. 
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that the failure to disclose was “in connection with” the purchase or 
sale of a security because the “securities transactions and breaches of 
fiduciary duty coincide.”165 
The use of Rule 10b-5 to punish broker-dealer misappropriation 
is difficult to reconcile with Rule 10b-5 as an antifraud rule that 
promotes efficient markets. Such theft is wrong, but it is not directed 
at the market and it does not distort stock market prices. Though 
framed in terms of a fraud claim involving a nondisclosure, the core 
harm of Zandford is not a failure to disclose. Would the theft have 
been justified under Rule 10b-5 if the broker had disclosed to the 
customer that he was misappropriating funds? Even if the 
nondisclosure enabled the theft, the wrong of the theft is not a lack of 
disclosure but the taking of the funds by a fiduciary to enrich himself. 
Zandford is best understood as an extension of the unjust 
enrichment principle introduced by O’Hagan.166 Broker-dealer 
misappropriation involves deceptive conduct (misappropriation) that 
unjustly enriches an individual (the broker) at the expense of another 
(the customer). The focus of a broker-dealer misappropriation case is 
not on damage caused to the market, but on unjust gains captured by 
the broker. Broker-dealer misappropriation is not a fraud directed at 
the market but an unjust enrichment much like insider trading. 
C. Mutual-Fund Market Timing 
The courts have also extended Rule 10b-5 to cover certain types 
of mutual-fund market timing, in which an investor such as a hedge 
fund enters into an arrangement with a mutual fund allowing the 
investor to profit by frequently trading in the mutual fund to take 
 
 165. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 824–25; see also Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The 
Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1639, 1656–57 (2004) (noting 
Zandford’s expansive interpretation of Rule 10b-5’s “in connection with” requirement). 
 166. As with the early insider trading cases, Zandford has largely been limited to contexts in 
which there is a fiduciary relationship. See, e.g., SEC v. Dorozhko, 606 F. Supp. 2d 321, 324 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008), vacated, 574 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2009) (denying the SEC’s motion for a 
preliminary injunction due to the lack of a fiduciary duty); In re Refco Capital Mkts., Ltd., 586 
F. Supp. 2d 172, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[N]one of the complaints adequately alleges that RCM 
engaged in deceptive conduct through affirmative acts or misrepresentations, breach of a 
fiduciary duty, or any other manner.”).  
  There is a question whether the Zandford test might be applied to nonfiduciary agency 
relationships as the Supreme Court did with respect to insider trading in O’Hagan, further 
expanding the reach of the unjust enrichment principle. 
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advantage of pricing inefficiencies.167 Market timing often harms other 
investors in the mutual fund because it generates transaction costs 
that those investors must bear.168 Both mutual funds that improperly 
allow market timing and investors who attempt to profit through 
market timing have been targeted under Rule 10b-5, with varying 
degrees of success. This Section describes how both types of market-
timing cases implicate the unjust enrichment principle. 
At least superficially, mutual funds that allow market timing 
might be subject to liability under the antifraud interpretation of Rule 
10b-5. Because of its costs, many mutual funds have policies against 
market timing and represent to investors that they prohibit market 
timing.169 Funds that publicly proclaim that they prohibit market 
timing while secretly allowing it are making a material misstatement 
to their investors. And indeed, many market-timing cases have 
included standard fraud claims under Rule 10b-5. 
In another sense, it is difficult to cabin the harm of allowing 
market timing solely within the scope of the antifraud rule. The 
theory that the mutual funds lied about market timing does not 
capture the full extent of the wrong. If a mutual fund were silent 
concerning whether it allowed market timing, there would be no 
fraud cause of action,170 but there would still be a case that the 
investor had been wronged under an unjust enrichment theory. 
Mutual fund managers owe fiduciary duties to mutual fund 
investors.171 The wrong of market timing is that the mutual fund 
 
 167. See, e.g., SEC v. Gann, 565 F.3d 932, 934–35 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Market timers typically 
buy and sell shares of a mutual fund quickly to take advantage of minute, short-term 
differentials between a fund’s value and the value of the securities it holds.”). 
 168. See, e.g., SEC v. Pimco Advisors Fund Mgmt. LLC, 341 F. Supp. 2d 454, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (“[Market timing] can also harm investors . . . by increasing trading and brokerage costs, 
as well as tax liabilities, incurred by a fund and spread across all fund investors.”); Stephen Choi 
& Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund Scandals, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1021, 1041 
(2007) (citing studies indicating that market timing reduces the returns of nontiming investors). 
 169. See, e.g., Pimco Advisors, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 459 (“The potential for market timing to 
harm the interests of mutual fund investors has led many mutual funds . . . to adopt policies 
intended to limit market timing within their funds.”). 
 170. Indeed, at least one court has dismissed a market-timing case because the funds did not 
represent to investors that they prohibited market timing and thus the complaint did not 
sufficiently allege fraud. SEC v. Tambone, 417 F. Supp. 2d 127, 134 (D. Mass. 2006) (“[T]he 
SEC has not alleged that the defendants made any untrue or misleading statement of material 
fact.”). 
 171. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 36(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (2006); SEC v. Capital 
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–92 (1963) (“The Investment Advisers Act of 
1940 thus reflects a congressional recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment 
advisory relationship,’ as well as a congressional intent to eliminate, or at least to expose, all 
PARK IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC 10/17/2010  10:36:59 PM 
382 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:345 
managers deceptively profit at the expense of investors to whom they 
owe a fiduciary duty. In exchange for the right to time markets, 
market timers promise mutual fund managers to invest additional 
assets, increasing the fees earned by the mutual fund managers.172 
And indeed, at least one court has recognized that deceptive market 
timing can violate Rule 10b-5 under a fiduciary-duty theory.173 
Allowing market timing is wrong not just because it violates truthful-
disclosure obligations, but also because it is a deceptive scheme that 
enriches a mutual fund’s managers at the expense of its investors. 
Similarly, parties that have engaged in market timing without the 
consent of mutual funds that have policies against market timing have 
also been held liable under Rule 10b-5. Courts have permitted Rule 
10b-5 actions against parties who tried to circumvent mutual fund 
limitations on market timing, often by submitting orders through 
multiple accounts.174 The difficulty with fitting such cases under an 
antifraud theory of Rule 10b-5 is that such conduct does not involve a 
misrepresentation or omission directed at investors or the market. 
The market timer is enriched through a deceptive course of conduct 
relating to its dealings with the mutual fund, which invests on the 
market timer’s behalf. Such deception may not fit within the category 
of fraud but is captured by the unjust enrichment principle set forth in 
O’Hagan. 
 
conflicts of interest which might incline an investment adviser—consciously or unconsciously—
to render advice which was not disinterested.” (footnote omitted)); accord EBC I, Inc. v. 
Goldman, Sachs & Co., 832 N.E.2d 26, 31–32 (N.Y. 2005) (recognizing a common-law fiduciary 
duty). 
 172. See, e.g., SEC v. Treadway, 430 F. Supp. 2d 293, 298–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (describing a 
scheme in which a mutual fund gave a hedge fund “market timing privileges in certain PIMCO 
funds in exchange for long-term or ‘sticky asset’ investments in other PIMCO funds”). 
 173. See In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 384 F. Supp. 2d 845, 856 (D. Md. 2005) (“Although 
market timing itself may be lawful, it nevertheless is prohibited by Rule 10b-5 if it is engaged in 
by favored market insiders at the expense of long-term mutual fund investors from whom it is 
concealed and who have a right to rely upon its prevention by fund advisers’ and managers’ 
good faith performance of their fiduciary obligations.”); see also Potter v. Janus Inv. Fund, 483 
F. Supp. 2d 692, 702 (D. Ill. 2007) (citing favorably the above-quoted language from Matter of 
Mutual Funds Investment Litigation, 384 F. Supp. 2d 845 (D. Md. 2005)). Another court was 
more skeptical that market-timing arrangements by themselves could support a claim under 
Rule 10b-5, though it noted that a breach of fiduciary duty might also support a claim under 
Section 36(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (2006). Pimco 
Advisors, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 469–72. 
 174. See, e.g., SEC v. Gann, 565 F.3d 932, 936 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The material misstatements 
at issue are [defendant’s] use of . . . varying client account numbers to disguise the frequency 
and magnitude of [the defendant’s] trading in the various funds.”); SEC v. O’Meally, No. 06 Civ. 
6483, 2008 WL 4090461, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2008) (describing a Rule 10b-5 claim against 
brokers who concealed their identities in connection with market-timing transactions). 
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D. Stock Option Backdating 
A final setting in which the unjust enrichment principle has been 
relevant is the stock option backdating scandal. Again, although stock 
option backdating has been described as fraud, an equally compelling 
explanation for the wrongness of the practice is unjust enrichment. 
Many companies compensate executives and other workers in 
part through stock options. A stock option gives an individual the 
right to buy a stock at a certain price, called the strike price, which is 
usually equal to the price of the stock on the day the stock option is 
awarded.175 In theory, stock options give workers and executives an 
incentive to increase the value of the firm so that they can exercise 
their stock options and profit from the differential between the strike 
price and the increased market price.176 
To make it more likely that recipients would exercise their stock 
options at a profit, some companies would retroactively change the 
award date of stock options to an earlier date when the stock price 
was lower.177 As a result, the strike price would be lower than if it had 
been recorded on the day the option was actually granted, increasing 
the probability that the stock option would be profitable when 
exercised.178 When academic studies uncovered this conduct, the 
revelation resulted in a significant number of criminal and civil 
enforcement actions.179 
Until 2005, stock option backdating could be used to improperly 
manipulate the company’s financial statements.180 Prior to that time, 
 
 175. See, e.g., Complaint ¶ 13, SEC v. Nicholas, SACV08-539 CJC (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2008); 
PATRICK CONROY, ERIK STETTLER, NATHAN SAPERIA, SUNIL PANIKKATH & MATTHEW 
EVANS, OPTIONS BACKDATING: A PRIMER 1–3 (2006), available at http://www.nera.com/ 
extImage/PUB_Backdating_Part_1_Primer_SEC1381_Jul2007-FINAL.pdf. 
 176. See, e.g., M.P. Narayanan, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, The Economic Impact 
of Backdating of Executive Stock Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597, 1605 (2007) (“The inclusion 
of stock options in executive compensation packages is generally meant to align management’s 
interests with the interests of the company’s shareholders. This is accomplished by making the 
executive’s compensation dependent on stock performance.” (footnote omitted)). 
 177. See, e.g., Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT. SCI. 802, 
805 n.4 (2005) (finding abnormally positive returns after option grants); Charles Forelle & 
James Bandler, The Perfect Payday, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18–19, 2006, at A1. 
 178. Of course, there is no guarantee that even a backdated stock option will be profitable. 
See, e.g., David I. Walker, Unpacking Backdating: Economic Analysis and Observations on the 
Stock Option Scandal, 87 B.U. L. REV. 561, 581–88 (2007). 
 179. Id. at 574–75. 
 180. In addition, there are tax implications. See, e.g., Narayanan et al., supra note 176, at 
1621–22 (listing “three potential effects on taxation”). 
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companies did not have to account for the cost of stock options as an 
expense unless they were “in the money”—that is, the strike price was 
lower than the market price on the date that the stock option was 
awarded.181 Backdating allowed a company to give stock options for 
which the market price on the date of issue exceeded the strike price, 
while representing that the options were not “in the money” and not 
recognizing an expense. 
Although stock option backdating might inflate the earnings of a 
company and be considered a fraud, it is unclear whether the practice 
fits within the antifraud conception of Rule 10b-5.182 Backdating 
arguably involves a misrepresentation; however, backdating by itself 
may not materially affect the market value of the backdating 
corporation.183 Though backdating affects the way in which the option 
grant is classified, potentially increasing earnings, in some cases the 
number of options awarded would not be large enough to 
significantly distort the market’s assessment of the company’s future 
earnings.184 And it is unlikely that stock option backdating was 
motivated by a desire to inflate earnings by masking the cost of 
compensation. Companies had wide leeway to give options that were 
not “in the money” without any earnings impact at all.185 
In backdating cases without a material impact on earnings, one 
might argue that backdating is important to investors because it says 
something about the character of management. If that is the case, the 
antifraud theory at least partly motivates the prohibition against 
 
 181. See, e.g., id. at 1622 (“If options were granted in-the-money, the difference between the 
grant date stock price and the exercise price (called the intrinsic value of the option) had to be 
treated as an expense and deducted from income.”). Since December 2005, companies must 
expense the fair market value of any stock options. Id. at 1623. 
 182. Many stock option backdating complaints allege violations of Rule 10b-5. See, e.g., 
Belova v. Sharp, No. CV 07-299-MO, 2008 WL 700961, at *7 (D. Or. Mar. 13, 2008) (denying a 
motion to dismiss a Rule 10b-5 claim in a backdating case); In re Zoran Corp. Derivative Litig., 
511 F. Supp. 2d 986, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (same). 
 183. See, e.g., Kara Scannell, Options Fines: A Hard Call, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2007, at C1 
(“[H]ow important was the backdating to Brocade if the stock recovered?”). 
 184. See, e.g., Narayanan et al., supra note 176, at 1611 (“A counterargument to the 
materiality claim may be made in cases where the backdating or forward-dating produced de 
minimis income for the executives, and thus had a minor effect on the financial statements.”). 
Of course, there will be cases in which the extent of backdating will have a significant impact on 
earnings. See, e.g., In re Take-Two Interactive Sec. Litig., 551 F. Supp. 2d 247, 291–92 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (finding that backdating was material when it led to overstatement of income by 20 
percent in 2002, 11 percent in 2003, and 5–6 percent in 2004 and 2006). 
 185. Walker, supra note 178, at 566 (“Under the accounting rules in place at the time, 
companies could have issued at-the-money options on unlimited numbers of shares without 
reporting any compensation expense in their earnings statements.”). 
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deceptive backdating.186 But it is equally likely that unjust enrichment 
rather than fraud is the primary reason such conduct is prohibited and 
punished.187 By increasing the probability that they could exercise a 
stock option at a price below the prevailing market price, executives 
granted themselves greater amounts of compensation than 
disclosed.188 As a result, stock option backdating may have led to the 
enrichment of executives who manipulated the system, violating the 
executives’ duty of loyalty.189 
Thus, although courts may require plaintiffs to fit backdating 
claims within an antifraud framework, the reason the backdating 
scandal spurred outrage was not the practice’s impact on earnings 
statements. The primary wrong of backdating is the gains by those 
who received backdated stock options rather than direct harm to 
shareholders. 
IV.  THE CONVERGENCE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND FRAUD 
Though the unjust enrichment strand of Rule 10b-5 doctrine 
described in Parts II and III is distinct from the rule’s antifraud roots, 
the unjust enrichment and antifraud principles have curiously 
 
 186. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 109, at 644–45 (“The recent options-backdating 
scandals have been a particularly compelling opportunity to make unjust enrichment 
arguments.”). 
  Judge Cote of the Southern District of New York has described a Rule 10b-5 stock 
option backdating case in unjust enrichment terms: 
These defendants received options, the exercise or strike prices of which did not 
match the actual date on which defendants received them. The options, most of which 
were allegedly backdated two days, garnered the defendants immediate returns of up 
to twenty percent of the exercise price. Such benefits are “concrete and personal” 
because they represent a species of compensation different from the one ordinarily 
accumulated by corporate officers and directors: In distinction to standard stock 
options, the returns on the backdated options are immediate and risk-free. 
In re Openwave Sys. Sec. Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d 236, 249–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 187. It is worth noting that many backdating complaints not only allege Rule 10b-5 claims 
but also state law unjust enrichment claims. See, e.g., In re Atmel Corp. Derivative Litig., No. C 
06-4592, 2008 WL 2561957, at *12 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2008); In re Verisign, Inc., Derivative 
Litig., 531 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1217–18 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
 188. As David Walker explains, although stock option backdating may not have had a 
significant earnings effect, the practice made it appear that executives were receiving less 
compensation through stock options than they really were. By making it appear that executives 
were receiving options at a time when the stock price was low, stock option backdating may 
have made it appear that executives received stock options that were worth less than the options 
that were actually granted. As a result, executives might have been able to negotiate higher pay 
packages than they would have received without backdating. See Walker, supra note 178, at 
588–91. 
 189. See, e.g., Narayanan et al., supra note 176, at 1617. 
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converged. This Part shows how the unjust enrichment principle has 
been used to subtly shape how Rule 10b-5 targets fraud in the context 
of the pleading requirements in a securities fraud class action. In 
many cases, it is becoming more difficult for plaintiffs to avoid 
dismissal without alleging that some manager was unjustly enriched 
through the fraud. To the extent that there are doubts about the 
validity of an unjust enrichment principle, the fact that the principle is 
invoked by those who seek to narrow the reach of Rule 10b-5 shows 
consensus on its relevance. 
A. The Scienter Requirement 
The use of the unjust enrichment principle as a limit originates 
from the requirement that, to state a claim on a Rule 10b-5 securities 
fraud action, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant acted with 
scienter. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,190 the Supreme Court 
sensibly read the text of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
as not extending liability to negligent acts.191 The Court held that to 
establish securities fraud under Rule 10b-5, a defendant must have 
acted with some degree of deceptive intent—that is, with scienter.192 
The need for a scienter requirement is apparent. Imposing 
liability for accidental misstatements would not make sense from a 
policy perspective. Companies make thousands of statements in any 
given year; some will contain mistakes. To impose liability for all such 
mistakes would impose substantial costs on companies that would 
prove unmanageable. Scienter distinguishes actionable from 
nonactionable misstatements in a way consistent with the common-
law definition of fraud. In doing so, scienter can serve as a screen that 
courts can use to dismiss meritless suits. 
Despite its usefulness as a limit, the scienter requirement can 
create a divergence between Rule 10b-5 and its goal of reducing 
misstatements that distort the efficiency of the markets. Rather than 
focusing on the nature of the misstatement and its effect on the 
market, the scienter requirement shifts the focus to the motivation of 
individual managers who might have been involved with the 
misstatement. A scienter requirement may shift Rule 10b-5 away 
 
 190. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
 191. Id. at 214. 
 192. Id. at 193. 
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from primarily regulating entities and their interaction with the 
market and toward regulating individual enrichment.193 
B. The “Concrete Benefits” Test 
As the need for limiting the costs of Rule 10b-5 actions has 
increased, the courts and Congress have fashioned more and more 
elaborate tests for determining whether a defendant acted with 
scienter. As this Section shows, these tests have shaped the substance 
of the scienter requirement so that it increasingly resembles an unjust 
enrichment test. 
Given the costs of discovery and the frequency of securities fraud 
class actions, courts have developed heightened pleading standards 
on the issue of scienter.194 Even in the absence of legislation, some 
courts required plaintiffs bringing cases under Rule 10b-5 to allege 
specific facts in the complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.195 The 
basis for requiring heightened pleading was Rule 9(b) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure,196 which requires plaintiffs to allege 
common-law fraud claims with particularity. The Second Circuit took 
the lead in imposing such a specificity requirement with respect to 
 
 193. Some federal circuit courts have further focused Rule 10b-5 on the conduct of 
individuals as opposed to entities by rejecting the possibility of “collective scienter,” requiring 
that scienter be established for some particular individual, rather than for the corporation itself. 
See, e.g., Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d 190, 
195 (2d Cir. 2008) (“To prove liability against a corporation, of course, a plaintiff must prove 
that an agent of the corporation committed a culpable act with the requisite scienter, and that 
the act (and accompanying mental state) are attributable to the corporation.”); Southland Sec. 
Corp. v. Inspire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th Cir. 2004) (rejecting “collective 
scienter” theory); Nordstrom, Inc. v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 54 F.3d 1424, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(“[T]here is no case law supporting an independent ‘collective scienter’ theory.”). Such an 
exclusive focus on individual scienter may not be merited because fraud often originates from 
dysfunctional groups. See generally James Fanto, Paternalistic Regulation of Public Company 
Management: Lessons from Bank Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 859, 904–07 (2006) (arguing that 
fraud in public companies tends to be the result of dysfunctional group mentalities). 
 194. Of course, the procedural standard for pleading scienter is not identical to the 
substantive standard for scienter. However, very few securities fraud class actions proceed past 
discovery. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in 
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 525 (1991) (citing studies finding that few 
securities class actions go to trial). Thus, the procedural rather than the substantive standard is 
in most cases determinative of whether a securities fraud class action will succeed. 
 195. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the 
Effect of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on ‘33 and ‘34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 537, 544–51 (1998) (describing different heightened pleading standards prior to passage of 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.)). 
 196. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
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scienter,197 reading Rule 9(b) to require that the plaintiff allege a 
“strong inference of fraudulent intent.”198 The plaintiff can establish 
this strong inference “(a) by alleging facts to show that defendants 
had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or (b) by alleging 
facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious 
misbehavior or recklessness.”199 
Of the two alternatives, recklessness is seen as more difficult to 
establish. To establish conscious recklessness under the Second 
Circuit standard, there must be a specific allegation that the 
defendants “knew facts or had access to information suggesting that 
their public statements were not accurate” or “failed to check 
information they had a duty to monitor.”200 Precise evidence that a 
defendant knew that information was false can be difficult to establish 
without internal information that cannot be obtained without 
discovery.201 
Motive and opportunity are somewhat easier to allege. Certainly, 
managers who control the corporation will have the opportunity to 
commit fraud. The main question is whether they have the motive to 
do so. On the surface, managers have many motives for causing 
misrepresentations, some of which can be characterized as personal. 
Managers may want to meet performance targets that result in 
bonuses, they may want to increase the stock price so that they can 
profitably exercise stock options, or they may just want to hang onto 
their jobs. But many managers who commit fraud may do so not for 
selfish personal reasons but because they believe that doing so serves 
the interests of the shareholders. For example, a manager might hide 
bad news because he thinks it will cause panic that will cause a sharp 
decline in the company’s stock price to a level below what 
management believes is the stock’s intrinsic value. 
The Second Circuit, however, narrowly defined “motive” to 
encompass only personal, or “concrete,” benefits. It stated that 
motive “entail[s] concrete benefits that could be realized by one or 
 
 197. Sale, supra note 195, at 549–51. 
 198. Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Goldman 
v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1070 (2d Cir. 1984) (concluding that “the Complaint alleged a 
sufficient factual basis to support its allegations of scienter”). 
 199. Shields, 25 F.3d at 1128. 
 200. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 201. See, e.g., Sale, supra note 195, at 573–74, 578–79 (noting that the heightened pleading 
standard effectively requires that the complaint allege internal information to survive a motion 
to dismiss). 
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more of the false statements and wrongful nondisclosures alleged.”202 
It specifically rejected the notion that general motives—such as 
making the company appear to be performing better, or even abstract 
economic self-interest—could be a concrete benefit.203 Under the 
Second Circuit’s scienter test, unless there is a specific allegation that 
a manager will personally benefit from a fraud, the motive element 
will not be satisfied. 
The Second Circuit’s motive-and-opportunity standard and 
“concrete benefits” test have become even more influential with the 
passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(PSLRA),204 which adopted a heightened pleading standard with 
respect to scienter to reduce the incidence of abusive securities fraud 
litigation.205 The PSLRA requires that the plaintiff plead facts 
establishing a “strong inference” of fraudulent intent.206 
The phrase “strong inference” is deliberately ambiguous,207 and 
circuit courts have split in deciding how to interpret it. One obvious 
possibility is that the PSLRA simply adopted the Second Circuit test 
for pleading scienter.208 And, indeed, after the PSLRA, the Second 
 
 202. Shields, 25 F.3d at 1130; see also Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 170 (2d Cir. 
2000) (citing Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124 (2d Cir. 1994), after Congress 
passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.)). 
 203. See, e.g., Kalnit v. Eichler, 264 F.3d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Insufficient motives, we 
have held, can include (1) the desire for the corporation to appear profitable and (2) the desire 
to keep stock prices high to increase officer compensation.”); Ganino, 228 F.3d at 170 (“General 
allegations that the defendants acted in their economic self-interest are not enough.”); Chill v. 
Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 268 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that creating the appearance of 
investment profit is insufficient); Shields, 25 F.3d at 1130 (holding that allegations that 
“executives aim to prolong the benefits of the positions they hold” are insufficient to survive a 
motion to dismiss). 
 204. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 
Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scatted sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). 
 205. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)–(2) (2006). 
 206. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2). The Supreme Court recently specified that “[t]o qualify as ‘strong’ . . . 
an inference of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it must be cogent 
and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.” Tellabs, Inc. v. 
Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007). 
 207. See Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: 
The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 650–66 
(2002) (concluding that the ambiguity of the “strong inference” standard was deliberate and 
facilitated passage of the PSLRA). 
 208. There is evidence in the legislative history that Congress modeled the PSLRA after the 
Second Circuit standard. See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 15 (1995) (stating that “the Committee 
chose a uniform standard modeled upon the pleading standard of the Second Circuit”). But see 
H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (“Because the Conference Committee intends 
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Circuit simply retained its motive-and-opportunity standard, 
including the “concrete benefits” test.209 A number of circuits have 
since adopted the Second Circuit’s motive-and-opportunity 
standard,210 and some circuits have explicitly adopted the Second 
Circuit’s “concrete benefits” test.211 
Some circuits have limited the test for scienter even more, 
finding that motive and opportunity alone do not establish scienter 
and requiring that a plaintiff plead intentional or reckless conduct at 
the motion to dismiss stage.212 Many circuits do rely upon the Second 
Circuit test, however, to the extent that they accept motive as a factor 
for determining whether recklessness has been alleged.213 Some of the 
 
to strengthen existing pleading requirements, it does not intend to codify the Second Circuit’s 
case law interpreting this pleading standard.”). 
 209. See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 310 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Rothman v. Gregor, 220 
F.3d 81, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The key question is motive, namely whether the Appellants 
adequately alleged ‘concrete benefits that could be realized by one or more of the false 
statements and wrongful disclosures alleged.’” (quoting Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 
F.3d 1124, 1130 (2d Cir. 1994))). 
 210. See, e.g., Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 659–60 (8th 
Cir. 2001) (using the Second Circuit’s motive-and-opportunity standard to frame its analysis); In 
re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 534–35 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiffs can 
plead scienter by proving motive and opportunity). 
 211. See Fla. State Bd. of Admin., 270 F.3d at 659 (noting that the Second Circuit test 
restricts the types of motive that give rise to liability); Phillips v. LCI Int’l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 
621 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing the Second Circuit in applying the “concrete benefits” test); see also 
Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 290 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that unusual levels of insider trading 
could support scienter but not explicitly adopting the “concrete benefits” test). 
 212. The Ninth Circuit imposed the strictest standard, requiring that the plaintiff plead 
“deliberate recklessness.” See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 
1999) (“In order to show a strong inference of deliberate recklessness, plaintiffs must state facts 
that come closer to demonstrating intent, as opposed to mere motive and opportunity.”); see 
also Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, In re Silicon Graphics Inc.: 
Shareholder Wealth Effects Resulting from the Interpretation of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act’s Pleading Standard, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 773, 774 (2000) (“The Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation in Silicon Graphics is the most stringent, requiring plaintiffs to allege facts that 
would show the defendants were ‘deliberately reckless’ in making the misrepresentation that 
gave rise to the fraud claim.”). Other circuits have rejected the motive-and-opportunity 
standard but have not required “deliberate” recklessness. See, e.g., Ottmann v. Hanger 
Orthopedic Grp., 353 F.3d 338, 345 (4th Cir. 2003); Nathenson v. Zonagen Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 
410–11 (5th Cir. 2001); City of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1261–62 (10th Cir. 
2001); Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 197 (1st Cir. 1999); Bryant v. Avado Brands, 
Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 1999); In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 551 
(6th Cir. 1999). 
 213. See, e.g., Ottmann, 353 F.3d at 345; Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 410–11; City of Philadelphia, 
264 F.3d at 1261–62; Greebel, 194 F.3d at 197; Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1285–86; In re Comshare, 183 
F.3d at 551. The Ninth Circuit has also considered motive as evidence of scienter. See Howard v. 
Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that motive and opportunity can be 
“considered as circumstantial evidence of [scienter]”). 
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circuits relying on a recklessness test consider motive in terms of 
concrete benefits.214 For example, the Ninth Circuit has stated that 
allegations of insider trading are relevant in supporting allegations of 
recklessness.215 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that although 
motive is not a prerequisite to liability, “personal financial gain may 
weigh heavily in favor of a scienter inference.”216  
The Second Circuit’s “concrete benefits” standard is a variant of 
the unjust enrichment principle. The standard shifts attention from 
whether the fraud has harmed plaintiff shareholders to whether the 
defendants have enriched themselves through the fraud. By 
distinguishing fraud motivated by unjust enrichment from fraud 
motivated by a desire to fool the market to keep the stock price high, 
the “concrete benefits” standard draws a somewhat arbitrary line. 
Although, in theory, a “concrete benefits” standard need not 
significantly shift the focus of Rule 10b-5 to unjust enrichment, in 
practice it has. Because of the need to move beyond a motion to 
dismiss, there is a natural tendency for plaintiffs’ attorneys to allege 
facts, such as trading on inside information, to meet the motive-and-
opportunity test. Indeed, Robert Thompson and Hillary Sale find that 
after the enactment of the PSLRA, there has been an increase in the 
number of allegations relating to insider trading.217 In influencing the 
nature of the cases brought under Rule 10b-5, the “concrete benefits” 
test affects the type of issues that judges decide, shaping the doctrine 
defining Rule 10b-5. 
 
  One study finds that sufficient allegation of motive is virtually a prerequisite to 
surviving a motion to dismiss. Ann Morales Olazabal & Patricia Sanchez Abril, The Ubiquity of 
Greed: A Contextual Model for Analysis of Scienter, 60 FLA. L. REV. 401, 404 (2008) (“[O]f the 
approximately one hundred reported circuit court decisions that have addressed scienter since 
the passage of the PSLRA, not a single case in which there was no apparent motive—or the 
motive alleged was practically or economically nonsensical—survived the dismissal stage.”). 
 214. See, e.g., Nathenson, 267 F.3d at 420 (finding that “allegations that corporate officers 
and directors would benefit from enhancing the value of their stock and/or stock options and 
that the corporation would benefit by receiving more for its shares to be issued in the July 1997 
public offering are likewise insufficient to support a strong inference of scienter”); City of 
Philadelphia, 264 F.3d at 1261–62 (citing the “concrete benefits” test in explaining that motive 
could be sufficient to support finding of recklessness in certain circumstances). 
 215. See Ronconi v. Larkin, 253 F.3d 423, 434–35 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 216. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 325 (2007). 
 217. Thompson & Sale, supra note 18, at 901 (“The use of insider trades as a hook for fraud 
was increasing before the 1995 Act, but its use has grown since that time, in part to meet the 
increasingly restrictive pleading standard imposed by Congress and welcomed by the courts.”). 
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The “concrete benefits” test may also serve as a heuristic that 
judges use to screen cases.218 Indeed, it has spawned a number of sub-
heuristics concerning what qualifies as a sufficient concrete benefit.219 
Nonexpert judges may interpret the existence of a concrete benefit as 
a prerequisite in pleading scienter, rather than simply one way of 
establishing scienter.220 As a result, some suits involving substantial 
misrepresentations that distort the market might be dismissed at the 
motion to dismiss stage without further inquiry if there is no evidence 
of concrete benefits.221 
Though narrowing the test for scienter makes the standard 
simpler to apply, the preoccupation with “concrete benefits” has the 
danger of creating a substantial disconnect between the efficient-
markets view of Rule 10b-5—that its purpose is to deter 
misstatements that hurt the ability of the market to value stocks—and 
its actual implementation, which tends to target cases in which 
individuals are unjustly enriched. Of course, to some extent, there is 
overlap. When managers manipulate stock prices so they can enrich 
themselves, the market’s ability to function is often hindered. But 
there are many cases in which there are substantial 
misrepresentations that are not motivated by personal benefit. With a 
“concrete benefits” test, such misrepresentations might not be 
scrutinized. 
 
 218. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The 
Same Way Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 
EMORY L.J. 83, 85 (2002) (noting that judges use heuristics to dismiss cases); Hillary A. Sale, 
Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903, 923–24 (2002) (noting that courts use the 
“concrete benefits” test as a heuristic to dismiss cases). 
 219. See, e.g., Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1995) (requiring 
“unusual insider trading activity” to satisfy the “concrete benefits” test and holding that stock 
sales of less than 11 percent were not sufficiently unusual); see also Rothman v. Gregor, 220 
F.3d 81, 94 (2d Cir. 2000) (listing instances in which insider trading has been found to be 
“unusual”); Sale, supra note 218, at 923–44 (describing various insider trading heuristics). But 
see In re Scholastic Corp. Sec. Litig., 252 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[N]one of these cases 
established a per se rule that the sale by one officer of corporate stock for a relatively small sum 
can never amount to unusual trading.”). 
 220. Generally, heuristics allow nonexpert judges to easily decide complex legal issues. See 
Bainbridge & Gulati, supra note 218, at 84–85. 
 221. See generally, Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598 (2007) (finding that securities fraud class 
actions without “hard evidence” of fraud are more likely to be dismissed after passage of the 
PSLRA). 
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C. Renewed Focus on Individual Liability 
In addition to the narrowing of Rule 10b-5’s scope by the courts 
through the “concrete benefits” test, a number of academic proposals 
would move Rule 10b-5 even closer toward the unjust enrichment 
principle. For example, a number of prominent commentators have 
proposed limiting Rule 10b-5’s scope by eliminating vicarious liability 
for securities fraud.222 For various reasons, it may be preferable to 
recover damages for securities fraud from individual managers rather 
than from the corporation. As agents of the corporation, individual 
managers are the ones who make misrepresentations to the market 
and may benefit personally from such fraud.223 Because unjust 
enrichment provides the primary incentive for fraud, it might be 
better to target the individual managers, not the corporations for 
which they work. 
A few commentators have gone even further and argued that 
securities fraud class actions under Rule 10b-5 should be limited to 
cases against individuals who are unjustly enriched by 
misrepresentations to the market.224 These commentators are 
skeptical of the utility of requiring the corporation to compensate its 
shareholders for securities fraud. Compensating injured shareholders 
with corporate funds arguably requires the shareholders to pay for 
part of their own compensation because it comes from the 
corporation that they own.225 In contrast, a payment from enriched 
 
 222. See, e.g., Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on 
Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 734; Coffee, Reforming, 
supra note 55, at 1582. 
 223. See, e.g., Arlen & Carney, supra note 222, at 694 (“We predict that Fraud on the 
Market generally will be committed by officers and directors seeking to conceal from the 
market, and from the firm’s shareholders, that the firm is ailing in an attempt to save their jobs 
and their investments in the firm.”); Coffee, Reforming, supra note 55, at 1572 (“The persons 
most responsible for the accounting irregularities at Enron, Worldcom, and a host of other 
companies were managers who, beginning in the 1990s, began to be primarily compensated with 
equity compensation and so had a strong incentive to recognize income prematurely in order to 
inflate reported income.”). 
 224. See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action as We Know 
It, 4 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 3 (2007) (“A [securities fraud class action] should be dismissed for 
failure to state a claim unless it appears that insiders have enjoyed gains from trading during the 
fraud period.”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 106, at 644 (arguing that restitution is an 
efficient measure of damages in Rule 10b-5 cases); Adam C. Pritchard, ‘Basic’ Error Is Focus on 
Loss, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 22, 2008, at 26 (proposing that damages in Rule 10b-5 fraud-on-the-
market actions be measured by defendants’ gain). 
 225. In an earlier article, I critique this “circularity problem.” See James J. Park, Shareholder 
Compensation as Dividend, 108 MICH. L. REV. 323 (2009). 
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individuals does not suffer from circularity when it comes from 
personal rather than corporate funds. Given this circularity problem 
and the costs of securities fraud class actions, some critics contend it is 
more efficient to limit damages in securities fraud class actions to the 
amount by which such individuals are unjustly enriched.226 If 
implemented, such a limit would complete the transformation of Rule 
10b-5 from an antifraud rule to an unjust enrichment rule. 
The proposals to limit Rule 10b-5’s reach to individuals who 
commit insider trading are a natural extension of the tendency of 
courts to require a showing of concrete benefits before a securities 
fraud class action may proceed. Oddly, these efforts to narrow the 
reach of Rule 10b-5 share a commonality with efforts to expand the 
reach of Rule 10b-5 in that they both rely upon the unjust enrichment 
principle. At the same time, the narrowing of Rule 10b-5 through use 
of the unjust enrichment principle may create tensions with the 
traditional efficient-markets rationale for Rule 10b-5. Part V 
describes the clash between unjust enrichment and efficient markets 
and how the two theories might be reconciled. 
V.  RECONCILING EFFICIENT MARKETS AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
Ironically, the once-controversial use of Rule 10b-5 to prohibit 
insider trading is now rarely questioned, whereas the conventional 
use of Rule 10b-5 to deter deceptive misstatements that distort stock 
market prices is more and more limited to cases involving insider 
enrichment. Despite this Article’s support for the unjust enrichment 
principle, this is a troubling development in that encouraging efficient 
markets should still be considered the primary purpose of Rule 10b-5. 
This Part seeks to reconcile the unjust enrichment principle with 
the traditional efficient-markets conception by describing Rule 10b-5 
as having first-order and second-order concerns. The first-order 
concern reflects the traditional economic goal of encouraging efficient 
markets. The second-order concern reflects a worry about unjust 
enrichment that offends public values. Although the efficient-markets 
concern is the primary purpose of Rule 10b-5, the unjust enrichment 
principle also plays a significant role in creating limits on the ways in 
which individuals can unfairly exploit markets. 
 
 226. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 106, at 634. 
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A. Efficient Markets 
Despite the increasing legitimacy of the unjust enrichment 
principle, this Section contends that courts and policymakers should 
be wary of thinking of Rule 10b-5 as mainly targeting unjust 
enrichment. The first-order concern of Rule 10b-5 is to encourage 
companies to disclose accurate information, enabling markets to 
function efficiently.227 Rule 10b-5 should not be reduced to a 
prohibition of insider trading. This Section discusses a number of 
areas in which the efficient-markets and unjust-enrichment 
conceptions are in tension and suggests ways to ensure that the rule’s 
first-order concern is not eclipsed. 
The shift to a Rule 10b-5 targeted primarily at insider enrichment 
is consistent with Paul Mahoney’s novel interpretation of the purpose 
of securities regulation. In a 1995 article, Mahoney argues that 
mandatory disclosure does more than promote efficient markets: it 
also checks agency costs.228 Disclosure by public companies allows 
investors to monitor self-dealing and shirking by management. Going 
beyond this descriptive point, Mahoney contends that mandatory 
disclosure should be limited to information necessary to monitor self-
dealing by management.229 For Mahoney, the cost of disclosure meant 
to encourage accurate pricing of securities was too high, and thus it 
might be more efficient if securities regulation focused on the 
problem of agency costs.230 
Though securities regulation does not limit mandatory disclosure 
to information necessary to monitor management, securities fraud 
enforcement is more and more directed at frauds that reflect agency 
costs. As shown earlier, courts increasingly rely on the heuristic of 
insider trading in determining whether the scienter requirement has 
been met, and there have been proposals to limit private enforcement 
of Rule 10b-5 to cases involving insider trading.231 
 
 227. As previously outlined in Part I, the importance of deterring fraud that harms markets 
is perhaps self-evident. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711, 713 (1996) (“[T]here is one thing 
[securities scholars] do agree on: fraud is very, very bad for securities markets.”). 
 228. See Mahoney, supra note 3, at 1048. 
 229. Id. at 1089–1104. 
 230. See id. at 1049; see also Mahoney, supra note 51, at 635 (“Private enforcement of Rule 
10b-5 . . . adds nothing to the arsenal of devices (principally the market for corporate control) 
used to reduce agency losses.”). 
 231. See supra Parts IV.B–C. 
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Although it may be the case that focusing on fraud motivated by 
unjust enrichment would be sufficient to deter securities fraud, there 
is also a danger that limiting fraud liability to cases involving 
individual enrichment would significantly underdeter.232 Managers 
who mislead the market are not always motivated to do so by 
personal enrichment. Limiting securities fraud class actions to cases 
involving unjust enrichment would mean that companies would have 
incentives to deceive the market in a way that cannot be linked back 
to individual enrichment. Moreover, the magnitude of investor losses 
caused by a securities fraud is typically much greater than the amount 
by which individuals may enrich themselves through such fraud. 
Securities fraud class actions will have no chance of significantly 
compensating those harmed by fraud if damages are limited to 
refunding those unjust enrichment gains. 
Certainly, the influence of the unjust enrichment principle on 
securities fraud class actions evidences a concern with administrative 
costs that must be balanced against the benefits of a strong fraud 
prohibition. The courts obviously focus on the narrow concept of 
“concrete benefits” because it provides a higher hurdle for plaintiffs 
than a broader conception of fraud. Scholars argue for limiting 
liability to individuals for a similar reason: the substantial costs 
associated with securities fraud class actions. A restrictive standard 
for pleading scienter is a convenient way for judges to screen out 
strike suits that are brought to extort a settlement. 
The convenience of narrowing the scienter standard comes at a 
cost: a growing disconnect between the screening standard and the 
role of securities fraud class actions as a facilitator of efficient 
markets. Perhaps the greatest danger of the rise of the unjust 
enrichment principle is its tendency to shift focus from the first-order 
concern of efficient markets to what is essentially a second-order 
concern. The lack of support for the fraud-on-the-market cause of 
action may partly reflect a growing ambiguity about what securities 
fraud class actions are supposed to do. To the extent that securities 
fraud class actions turn on whether there is proof of individual 
 
 232. Of course, the heightened pleading standards of the PSLRA do not apply to actions 
brought by the SEC. That is not to say that the SEC does not consider unjust enrichment in 
enforcing Rule 10b-5. Enrichment is a factor in determining whether the SEC will seek 
penalties. Press Release, SEC, Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm 
(“If the corporation is in any other way unjustly enriched, this similarly weighs in support of the 
imposition of a corporate penalty.”). 
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enrichment, results will seem arbitrary. Suppose Company A commits 
the same accounting misstatement as Company B. Managers of both 
companies are motivated by a desire to increase the stock price, but 
only Company B is liable because an executive happened to sell a 
significant amount of stock. If the primary concern is to promote 
efficient markets, the relevant consideration should be the intent to 
fool the market rather than personal enrichment.233 
Courts might better strike a balance between screening meritless 
cases and maintaining a regime in which Rule 10b-5 consistently 
encourages efficient markets by not defining scienter exclusively in 
terms of “concrete benefits.” Fraud that is motivated by a general 
desire to make the corporation appear to be doing better than it is 
can be just as harmful to the functioning of a market as fraud that is 
motivated by a desire to personally benefit through stock sales. 
Managers are not solely motivated by the desire to line their pockets 
but may instead commit fraud because they think it will benefit 
shareholders.234 Although there is a need to limit the reach of 
securities fraud class actions, judges should be careful not to use the 
“concrete benefits” test as an arbitrary heuristic that overly narrows 
the scope of scienter. Focusing on a heuristic may result in securities 
fraud class actions drifting further and further from their initial 
purpose, which is to deter and compensate for material 
misrepresentations that distort efficient markets. 
Because the proposals discussed in Part IV.C would essentially 
make Rule 10b-5 an unjust enrichment rule, courts should not limit 
 
 233. The regime set forth by Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 is a more consistent 
effort to promote efficient markets. See Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) § 11, 15 
U.S.C. § 77k (2006). The primary factor determining liability under Section 11 is whether the 
misstatement is material or not. Id. Individual directors and officers can evade liability by 
establishing that they acted with due diligence. Id. Of course, the context of Section 11, in which 
the corporation is acting as a seller of securities, differs from Rule 10b-5 cases, in which the 
fraud does not relate to the purchase or sale of securities by the corporation. But the Section 11 
action is an example of a regime in which liability for securities fraud does not hinge on unjust 
enrichment. 
 234. See, e.g., Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(describing a securities fraud in which management “conceal[ed] bad news in the hope that it 
[would] be overtaken by good news”); Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate 
Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others 
and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 296 (2004) (“[F]inancial misreporting is 
complicated in motivation. It can be self-serving, potentially profitable for the business, or—
frequently—both at the same time.”); James C. Spindler, Vicarious Liability for Bad Corporate 
Governance: Are We Wrong About 10b-5?, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. (forthcoming fall 2010) 
(manuscript at 7–14) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (presenting a model in which 
managers commit fraud to maximize shareholder returns). 
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Rule 10b-5 actions to insider trading defendants or do away with 
vicarious liability for securities fraud. Although insider trading is 
certainly wrong, it does not capture the distinct harm of fraudulent 
misstatements that distort the market price of a security. The 
significance of a misstatement does not hinge on whether some 
individual benefited from it, but on whether reasonable investors 
would believe the misstatement to be important. Although enforcing 
norms against corruption helps enable an efficient market, markets 
also need some assurance about the reliability of information in order 
to function. Obtaining this assurance requires targeting not only the 
individuals enriched but also the corporations whose regulatory 
filings and financial statements are permeated with misstatements. 
The increasing focus of securities law on the scienter inquiry, 
which mainly assesses the enrichment of a defendant, rather than 
materiality, which evaluates the potential harm to the market of the 
misstatement, is perhaps the strongest evidence that Rule 10b-5 is 
becoming an unjust enrichment rule. Reversing this trend may 
require revival of the materiality standard. The materiality standard 
may be a better way of managing the administrative costs of Rule 
10b-5 while avoiding a conflict with the first-order concern of 
encouraging efficient markets.235 In applying the materiality standard, 
courts would be asking the question that matters—does the 
misstatement affect the ability of the markets to value a stock?—
rather than the secondary question of whether the misstatement was 
made to enrich an insider. If the materiality standard were defined 
with sufficient specificity, it could screen cases without merit as ably 
as the “concrete benefits” standard, keeping administrative costs low. 
Courts and policymakers should thus reject efforts to define 
materiality so broadly that securities fraud liability can be triggered 
by all forms of unjust enrichment.236 As I argued in an earlier article, 
the expansive version of materiality set forth in SAB No. 99 increases 
the costs imposed by securities fraud class actions.237 Even minimal 
inflations of earnings might be material under Rule 10b-5, so long as 
 
 235. See, e.g., James J. Park, Assessing the Materiality of Financial Misstatements, 34 J. CORP. 
L. 513, 550 (2009) (proposing that courts should focus on the persistence of financial 
misstatements in assessing their materiality). 
 236. It is worth noting that, in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court observed: “We 
find no authority in [Section 10(b)], the legislative history, or our previous decisions for varying 
the standard of materiality depending on . . . whether insiders are alleged to have profited.” 485 
U.S. 224, 240 n.18 (1988). 
 237. See Park, supra note 235, at 550–52. 
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the plaintiff can plead that such inflation is associated with insider 
stock sales or management bonuses. Courts are less able to dismiss 
meritless securities fraud class actions at the motion to dismiss stage 
on materiality grounds so long as such allegations are present. 
Companies should not be liable for every form of unjust enrichment 
by their agents, but rather should only be liable for the largest and 
most persistent misstatements that distort their market value.238 
Narrowing the materiality standard would focus securities fraud class 
actions on the first-order concern of efficient markets rather than the 
second-order concern of unjust enrichment. 
B. The Unjust Enrichment Principle 
The best way to reconcile the unjust enrichment principle with 
the conception of Rule 10b-5 as an antifraud rule is to think of unjust 
enrichment as a distinct but second-order concern. As this Section 
shows, rather than solely being concerned with economic efficiency, 
Rule 10b-5 also reflects public values. Although subjecting market 
participants to liability under a broadly worded principle may cause 
concern, this Section argues that overenforcement of the unjust 
enrichment principle is unlikely and offers suggestions for structuring 
the doctrine that implements the unjust enrichment principle. 
1. The Unjust Enrichment Principle as a Public Value.  Although 
the efficient-markets purpose of Rule 10b-5 is important, it is 
undeniable that Rule 10b-5 is also concerned with unjust enrichment. 
The rise of the unjust enrichment principle reflects the reality that 
securities regulation is not solely concerned with efficiency239 but also 
implements widely recognized public values. Though there are 
dangers in relying on an unjust enrichment principle—most notably 
 
 238. See Park, supra note 235, at 518–19 (arguing that vicarious liability for securities fraud 
should not be triggered by misstatements that are only qualitatively material). 
 239. Economists are generally not concerned with the distributional issues that are the focus 
of the unjust enrichment principle. For example, a policy is Kaldor-Hicks efficient when the 
gains from a policy are greater than the losses, so that the gaining parties could theoretically pay 
off the losing parties, regardless of whether such a payoff actually occurs. See John R. Hicks, 
Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696, 712 (1939) (“If measures making for 
efficiency are to have a fair chance, it is extremely desirable that they should be freed from 
distributive complications as much as possible.”); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of 
Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549, 550 (1939) (“In all 
cases . . . where a certain policy leads to an increase in physical productivity, and thus of 
aggregate real income, the economist’s case for the policy is quite unaffected by the question of 
the comparability of individual satisfactions . . . .”). 
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that the principle’s application may be driven by uninformed 
populism240—those dangers are likely manageable because of the high 
transaction costs of the principle’s enforcement. 
A number of legal scholars have argued that the law reflects 
important public values that are widely recognized by a community.241 
The use of the unjust enrichment principle to shape the contours of 
Rule 10b-5 might be characterized as an application of a public 
value.242 The unjust enrichment principle is rooted in societal norms 
reflected in many areas of the law. Ronald Dworkin notes the 
existence of a common law principle that “[n]o one shall be permitted 
to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or 
to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by 
his own crime.”243 Similarly, statutory and constitutional prohibitions 
against government corruption reflect the idea that if government 
officials profit personally from their offices, government will be less 
likely to operate for the public interest.244 
 
 240. See, e.g., Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A 
Look Ahead at the Next Decade, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 149, 210–12 (1990) (criticizing the SEC’s 
use of the “Small Dollar program” to achieve “high visibility and [a] publicly-favorable 
response”); cf. Crane, supra note 17, at 1162–63 (discussing the belief that “the general public 
often overreacts to risks, thus prompting excessive levels of risk regulation” in the context of 
antitrust). 
 241. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1007, 1015 (1989) (“The core idea of public values scholarship is that there are at least 
some values . . . that have worth and contribute to the moral growth of our society.”); Owen M. 
Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11 
(1979) (noting that constitutional provisions reflect public values that “give our society an 
identity and inner coherence—its distinctive public morality”); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked 
Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1692 (1984) (“[T]he Constitution 
requires all government action to be justified by reference to some public value.”). 
 242. Elsewhere, I argue that principles-based enforcement actions by securities regulators 
often reflect public values. See, e.g., Park, supra note 17, at 668 (“By articulating public values, 
[principles-based enforcement actions] may decisively address public concerns.”). 
 243. Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 23–24 (1967) (quoting 
Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511 (1889) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 244. See generally Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
341 (2009) (arguing that a primary concern of the U.S. Constitution is addressing corruption). 
Corruption can distort the political process on which any democracy relies. It does so in at least 
two ways. First, it results in a system in which the political process reflects the interests of a few 
rather than the collective will of the public. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153 (2003) 
(“Just as troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger 
that officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or the desires of their constituencies, but 
according to the wishes of those who have made large financial contributions valued by the 
officeholder.”). Second, it results in a system in which those who are elected to serve the public 
instead enrich themselves. See, e.g., Teachout, supra, at 373–74 (“To the delegates, political 
corruption referred to self-serving use of public power for private ends, including, without 
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At its core, the unjust enrichment principle applied to the 
securities regulation context sets limits on the extraction of wrongful 
gains from securities markets. Even if those limits are not always 
clear, it is undeniable that they exist. The principle is partly premised 
on the idea that in American society, markets are meant to increase 
social welfare.245 To the extent that markets primarily benefit only a 
few privileged individuals, they are not fulfilling their social function. 
Such a principle is not based solely on economic considerations but is 
a public value grounded on moral considerations. 
Although at first glance it seems that the unjust enrichment 
principle has little applicability to securities markets, which are 
premised on the idea that some market participants will enrich 
themselves over others, there is a consensus that certain types of 
enrichment go too far and are therefore unjust. Just as government 
will not function if it is permeated by corruption, there is a sense that 
markets permeated with unjust enrichment will ultimately fail.246 
Steve Thel has found that the legislative history of Section 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 reflects a concern with 
preventing market manipulation rather than solely a desire to target 
fraud.247 Donald Langevoort notes that insider trading enforcement is 
motivated by expressive considerations and a fear that “market 
norms too easily create subcultures that glorify and rationalize 
selfishness.”248 The unjust enrichment principle is also reflected in the 
 
limitation, bribery, public decisions to serve private wealth . . . and use by public officials of their 
positions of power to become wealthy.”). 
 245. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Making Markets: Network Effects and the Role of Law in 
the Creation of Strong Securities Markets, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 283–96 (2003) (describing the 
positive social welfare implications of network effects on markets); John F. Berry III, The 
Economics of Outsider Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1307, 1315–19 (1981) 
(arguing that the purpose of securities markets is Pareto optimal resource allocation); Dalia 
Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1861, 1906 (2003) (describing the acceptance of markets by progressives for instrumental 
reasons). 
 246. See, e.g., David Mills & Robert Weisberg, Corrupting the Harm Requirement in White 
Collar Crime, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1438 (2008) (“The public law doctrines punishing 
supposed injuries to honest government have begun to blend with, or morph into, doctrines 
punishing actions alleged to cause diffuse harms to the honesty of the capital markets.”). 
 247. See Thel, supra note 3, at 409 (“[S]urely, one trying to explain the enactment and 
objectives of the Exchange Act cannot forget that in 1934 there was a widespread consensus 
that excessive stock market speculation and the collapse of the stock market had brought down 
the economy, and that those who enacted the Exchange Act were primarily concerned with 
preventing a recurrence.”). 
 248. Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider 
Trading Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1328 (1999). 
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,249 which requires top executives to 
disgorge bonuses that they received based on financial results that 
were later found to be false.250 
It is telling that both those who would expand the reach of Rule 
10b-5 and those who would limit its reach agree on one thing: unjust 
enrichment is a category of conduct that is particularly significant. 
Even the Delaware Court of Chancery, not known for its inclination 
to regulate with a heavy hand, applied the unjust enrichment 
principle in a case against HealthSouth founder Richard Scrushy 
when there was earnings manipulation but a civil fraud case could not 
proceed because of a pending criminal case.251 The court required 
Scrushy to pay millions of dollars in restitution to HealthSouth 
without a finding of any culpable intent.252 Even if not all would agree 
with respect to the unjust enrichment principle’s scope, there seems 
to be a consensus that the principle matters. 
 
 249. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 250. See id. § 304, 116 Stat. at 778 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006)). 
 251. In a derivative case, the Delaware Court of Chancery granted a motion for summary 
judgment in favor of shareholder plaintiffs who pressed a state law unjust enrichment claim 
against Scrushy, who had paid back a $25 million loan from HealthSouth with HealthSouth 
stock that later collapsed in value. In re HealthSouth S’holders Litig., 845 A.2d 1096, 1099–1100 
(Del. Ch. 2003), aff’d, 847 A.2d 1121 (Del. 2004). Because Scrushy was subject to a criminal 
proceeding, the plaintiffs did not contend that he acted with intent or that he knew that 
HealthSouth’s financial statements were inflated. Id. at 1103 n.10. Instead, they argued that, 
regardless of whether Scrushy defrauded the company, he was unjustly enriched by the 
transaction and the transaction should be rescinded. Id. at 1103. 
  Vice Chancellor Strine noted that in Delaware, unjust enrichment is defined broadly as 
“the unjust retention of a benefit to the loss of another, or the retention of money or property of 
another against the fundamental principles of justice or equity and good conscience.” Id. at 1105 
(citing Schock v. Nash, 732 A.2d 217, 232–33 (Del. 1999)). Strine noted that Scrushy was in a 
position of superior knowledge with respect to the contents of HealthSouth’s financial 
statements. Id. at 1106. Even without fraudulent intent, Strine found a substantive unjust 
enrichment claim, explaining: “Whether or not Scrushy breached any cognizable duty in signing 
those statements, he was undoubtedly unjustly enriched when the company of which he was a 
fiduciary bought back shares from him at a price inflated by false financial statements he had 
signed.” Id. 
  The Delaware Chancery’s decision in Matter of HealthSouth Shareholders Litigation, 
845 A.2d 1096 (Del. Ch. 2003), aff’d, 847 A.2d 1121 (Del. 2004), is consistent with a pattern 
identified by Edward Rock in which Delaware courts apply broadly worded standards through 
adjudication to create narratives that instruct directors and officers with respect to their duties. 
See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA 
L. REV. 1009, 1015 (1997) (“[T]he Delaware courts fill out the concept of ‘good faith’ through 
fact-intensive, normatively saturated descriptions of manager, director, and lawyer conduct, and 
of process—descriptions that are not reducible to rules . . . .”). 
 252. In re HealthSouth, 845 A.2d at 1106. 
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2. Translating the Unjust Enrichment Principle into Doctrine.  
The unjust enrichment principle is more controversial than the 
efficient-markets conception of Rule 10b-5. As a general matter, 
public values, which reflect moral judgments, are more likely than 
economic analyses to involve difficult choices between competing 
considerations.253 For the unjust enrichment principle to continue to 
be relevant, courts must feel comfortable translating it into doctrine. 
Though vagueness may be an inevitable shortcoming of the unjust 
enrichment principle, the doctrinal framework set forth by the 
Supreme Court in O’Hagan is a useful starting point that with 
modification may be workable. 
Despite the wide recognition of the unjust enrichment principle, 
there are a number of objections that could be raised to the use of 
Rule 10b-5 to enforce the principle. First, the expansion of Rule 10b-5 
reflects a general increase in federal involvement with corporate 
governance that might stifle a “race to the top.”254 It might be more 
appropriate for state corporate law to regulate unjust enrichment 
than for federal securities law to do so.255 Second, an unjust 
enrichment principle can evoke moralistic thoughts of class 
resentment and redistribution.256 In times of economic crisis, the 
public tends to focus on the great wealth captured by those who work 
 
 253. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 
417 (1999) (arguing that deterrence rhetoric and analysis of its costs and benefits “elides the 
points of moral contention that motivate public positions on . . . disputed issues”). 
 254. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1595 (2005) (“[S]tates can be expected to be more 
effective in setting the appropriate corporate governance default rules than Congress or the 
SEC.”). But see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from 
History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793 (2006) (arguing that federal intervention has protected 
investors). 
 255. Although insider trading is now covered by federal law, it might have been 
conceptualized as a breach of the state fiduciary duty of loyalty. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, 
Federalism and Insider Trading, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 123, 123 (1998) (arguing that the harm 
of insider trading could be addressed by state law); see also Bainbridge, supra note 134, at 1266–
68 (arguing that courts should incorporate state law in interpreting federal insider trading 
prohibition). 
 256. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 248, at 1329 (noting, with respect to insider trading 
prohibitions, that “there may be an emotional component in which envy and frustration at the 
wealth and power of economic elites, and resulting mistrust, also play a role”); Jonathan 
Weisman, Sudeep Reddy & Liam Plevin, Political Heat Sears AIG: Obama Vows to Block 
Bonuses, But It May Be Too Late, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2009, at A1 (describing outrage at 
bonuses paid to employees of AIG). 
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in the securities industry.257 Calls for reform are often rooted in 
nothing more than a sense that an injustice has occurred.258 Third, the 
unjust enrichment principle is problematic because of its vagueness. 
Due process requires reasonable notice as to the conduct that will 
incur a government sanction.259 Unlike the antifraud rule, which 
points to a particular type of misconduct—misleading representations 
or omissions—the unjust enrichment principle does not single out any 
particular misconduct as actionable. As a result, an unjust enrichment 
principle gives regulators and courts a great deal of discretion to 
define the contours of Rule 10b-5 in unpredictable ways.260 
At their core, these objections are based on a fear of 
overenforcement. But overenforcement may be less of a problem for 
unjust enrichment claims than it is for securities fraud class actions. 
Because the unjust enrichment principle targets gains by individuals, 
the potential recovery is often smaller than for a securities fraud that 
harms thousands of shareholders, and thus is less likely to attract 
entrepreneurial plaintiffs. Because they usually deal with individual 
transactions, unjust enrichment claims are not as susceptible to 
aggregation through class actions as fraud claims. And as seen in the 
context of insider trading, unjust enrichment claims can be difficult to 
establish. As a result, unjust enrichment claims are most likely to be 
brought by government enforcers, who may have fewer incentives to 
overenforce.261 Enforcers might use limited resources to target the 
 
 257. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF 
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 110–13 (1994) (describing populist influence on securities 
regulation). 
 258. See, e.g., Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of 
Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 851 (1997) (“[M]any people argued . . . that securities trading 
was harmful because it was a zero-sum game, in which repeat players could make consistent 
gains at the expense of wave after wave of neophytes.”). 
 259. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (“It is established that a law 
fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it 
leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits . . . .”) (quoting Giaccio v. 
Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402–03 (1966)). 
 260. A number of commentators have noted the tendency of the SEC to engage in 
“regulation by enforcement.” See, e.g., ROBERTA KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 
336 (1982) (“[T]he SEC has abused its prosecutorial independence by transforming its 
enforcement program into a policy-making, and, therefore, highly political tool.”); Pitt & 
Shapiro, supra note 240, at 155. But see Park, supra note 17, at 635–41 (critiquing the 
“regulation by enforcement” argument). 
 261. See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: A Proposal for 
Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1304 (2008) (“A monopolistic public enforcer can deal with the 
overdeterrent potential of an overbroad liability rule through use of discretionary 
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most egregious, clear-cut cases of securities-related unjust 
enrichment. This enforcement might both deter the undesirable 
conduct and have an expressive value in applying public values to the 
securities markets. 
Moreover, many of the concerns about overenforcement might 
be met through further definition of the doctrinal test that 
implements the unjust enrichment principle. As noted earlier, 
O’Hagan can be read as setting forth three elements for a Rule 10b-5 
unjust enrichment claim.262 The unjust enrichment principle applies to 
(1) deceptive conduct (2) coinciding with a securities transaction (3) 
that enriches some individual at the expense of others. 
The first element, deceptive conduct, increases the range of Rule 
10b-5 because, unlike the antifraud rule, it does not require a specific 
misrepresentation or omission directed at the market or investors. 
Under the unjust enrichment principle, a broader range of conduct—
such as theft, manipulation, or an undisclosed special arrangement—
is sufficient to trigger Rule 10b-5. Though it attaches to a wider range 
of conduct, the requirement of deception provides a significant limit 
to the reach of the unjust enrichment principle. One way of further 
limiting the unjust enrichment principle would be to require a 
showing of intentional misconduct.263 The concern that the principle is 
too vague might be partially met by reserving its application to the 
worst forms of misconduct. Limiting the unjust enrichment principle 
to intentional misconduct might help ensure that enforcement focuses 
on cases in which there is more likely to be social consensus that the 
conduct in question is wrong. 
Perhaps a natural limit on the reach of the unjust enrichment 
principle is that the opportunity for deceptive schemes varies 
depending on the status of the individual as a fiduciary, an agent, or 
an outsider.264 Obviously, the fiduciary has the greatest opportunities 
to deceive. Fiduciaries are trusted to make a wide range of decisions 
on behalf of those who may not be sophisticated or have the ability to 
monitor the fiduciary. The fiduciary is given a great degree of trust 
 
nonenforcement, or by pursuing a cooperative approach to regulation, and it can adjust its 
approach if it appears to have gotten the deterrence calculus wrong.”). 
 262. See supra Part II.C. 
 263. In contrast, a traditional Rule 10b-5 securities fraud action can proceed with a showing 
of recklessness. Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 264. In the context of insider trading, “outsider” often refers to a person with an agency 
relationship to the corporation. Here, “outsider” simply refers to an individual without a 
relevant fiduciary or agency relationship. 
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and thus significant opportunities to engage in deceptive conduct 
without fear of discovery. 
Like the fiduciary, the agent also is entrusted to act on behalf of 
a principal, who may not be able to monitor the agent. The difference 
between the agent and fiduciary is that the agent’s responsibilities are 
usually narrower. The unjust enrichment principle may thus be 
relevant to a narrower range of conduct with respect to the agent. 
Finally, the outsider has no obligations or power and thus has 
limited opportunity for deception. The outsider will have to take 
extreme measures, such as theft, to obtain enrichment. Given the 
costs of such measures, deceptive conduct by outsiders that could be 
subject to the unjust enrichment principle will be less common than 
such conduct by fiduciaries and agents. 
The second element of the O’Hagan test, the requirement that 
unjust enrichment coincide with a securities transaction, can also 
serve as an important limit on the type of wrongful conduct that 
might trigger Rule 10b-5. Not just any wrongful conduct triggers Rule 
10b-5; rather, there must be a substantial connection to a securities 
transaction. Thus, if someone embezzles money from a bank and 
invests the money in a stock, that might satisfy the deceptive conduct 
element of the unjust enrichment test, but there would be enough of a 
disconnect between the initial theft and subsequent investment so 
that the second element of coinciding with a securities transaction 
would not be met.265 
The third element, the requirement of enrichment by an 
individual, might naturally be limited by the requirement that unjust 
enrichment liability can only be triggered if the enrichment occurs at 
the expense of others. A likely criticism of the Rule 10b-5 unjust 
enrichment principle is that it arguably jettisons traditional limits to 
Rule 10b-5, such as fiduciary and agency relationships, and leaves 
only an amorphous concept of wrongfulness. The third element could 
 
 265. In addition, to partly meet the concern of preempting state law, Rule 10b-5 unjust 
enrichment claims might be limited to securities transactions on a national exchange. Other 
securities transactions might be better regulated through state unjust enrichment law. State 
unjust enrichment laws differ from the Rule 10b-5 unjust enrichment principle in that some 
states do not require an element of deception. See In re HealthSouth S’holders Litig., 845 A.2d 
1096, 1099 (Del. Ch. 2003), aff’d, 847 A.2d 1121 (Del. 2004) (“[N]either [unjust enrichment nor 
equitable fraud] is dependent on Scrushy’s actual knowledge of the inaccuracy of HealthSouth’s 
financial information.”). In contrast, some deceptive conduct (though not necessarily a specific 
misrepresentation directed at the market) is required to support a Rule 10b-5 unjust enrichment 
claim. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2010). 
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be modified in such a way as to meet this objection so that although a 
fiduciary or agency relationship is not a prerequisite to triggering the 
unjust enrichment principle, the difficulty of establishing this element 
might differ based on whether the individual is a fiduciary, an agent, 
or an outsider. Given their broadly defined duties to shareholders, 
fiduciaries might face a rebuttable presumption that wrongful 
enrichment occurred at the expense of others. With agents and 
outsiders, there might be no presumption, and it would be the 
plaintiff’s burden to prove that the wrongful enrichment occurred at 
the expense of others. 
3. Application of the Unjust Enrichment Principle.  The 
application of this test can be illustrated by a simple example relating 
to a possible extension of the unjust enrichment principle. In light of 
the recent public backlash against excessive compensation 
packages,266 one can imagine circumstances in which Rule 10b-5 could 
be used to challenge stock-based compensation obtained through 
misconduct. Such unjust enrichment relating to securities obtained as 
executive compensation would be difficult to distinguish from insider 
trading by agents prohibited in O’Hagan. 
Envision a case in which the CEO of a publicly traded company 
is negotiating with the board and deliberately submits false 
information to the board’s compensation committee, knowing it will 
be used in determining the CEO’s compensation, much of which is in 
the form of stock and stock options. 
Under a narrow antifraud reading of Rule 10b-5, such 
misconduct might not be actionable. The misrepresentation is not 
 
 266. See, e.g., Ian Bremmer & Sean West, AIG and “Political Risk,” WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 
2009, at A15 (“The bonuses represent greed in the face of dire circumstances, which resonates 
with Joe the TARP-funder.”); Weissman et al., supra note 256 (describing outrage at bonuses 
paid to employees of AIG). On July 30, 2009, New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo 
released a report detailing bonuses paid to various employees of banks receiving government 
bailout funds. See ANDREW M. CUOMO, NO RHYME OR REASON: THE “HEADS I WIN, TAILS 
YOU LOSE” BANK BONUS CULTURE (2009). The report sparked a flurry of front-page articles 
questioning how compensation could remain so high despite the losses suffered by the banks. 
See, e.g., Susanne Craig & Deborah Solomon, Bank Bonus Tab: $33 Billion, WALL ST. J., July 
31, 2009, at A1; Louise Story & Eric Dash, Bankers Reaped Lavish Bonuses During Bailouts, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2009, at A1. It is important to note that the criticism of executive 
compensation practices is not limited to populists. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, 
PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
1 (2004) (“[O]ne economist has calculated that the dramatic growth in executive pay during the 
1990s was outpaced by the increase in the volume of research papers on the subject.”). 
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directed at investors or the market, and it might not be material even 
if it had been so directed. 
There could, however, be a cause of action under the modified 
O’Hagan test for unjust enrichment. First, there is deceptive 
misconduct. This is a prime example of the broad range of contexts in 
which fiduciaries have the opportunity for deceptive enrichment.267 If 
a CEO influences the process by which his compensation is set, he has 
a unique ability to manipulate the process. If his deception is 
intentional, it is especially blameworthy. Second, the deceptive 
misconduct is in connection with a security—stock-based 
compensation. The deception allowed the CEO to obtain more stock 
than he merited. Finally, because the CEO is a fiduciary, there would 
be a rebuttable presumption that the inflated compensation came at 
the expense of shareholders. 
Such a use of Rule 10b-5 no doubt would be controversial, but 
courts could conceivably uphold it as an extension of O’Hagan. If 
such a case succeeds, it would only be the latest step in the gradual 
expansion of Rule 10b-5 based on the unjust enrichment principle. 
CONCLUSION 
Rule 10b-5 is now much more than a provision that “catches 
fraud.” Although it has primarily been an antifraud rule that 
facilitates efficient markets, Rule 10b-5 is also shaped by an unjust 
enrichment principle covering deceptive conduct related to a 
securities transaction that enriches an individual. The increasing use 
of the unjust enrichment principle has not only expanded the reach of 
Rule 10b-5 but also has limited it in important ways. Rather than 
being unrelated areas of law, insider trading and securities fraud 
doctrine are both increasingly shaped by the unjust enrichment 
principle. 
Courts, regulators, and academics should all recognize the 
important role played by the unjust enrichment principle in the 
context of Rule 10b-5. At the same time, courts should be wary of 
relying on the second-order concern of unjust enrichment to the 
extent that it unduly diverts Rule 10b-5 from its first-order concern of 
deterring material misrepresentations about a stock that prevent 
 
 267. The question might be more difficult if there were only a failure to disclose rather than 
an affirmative deception. Cf. Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 165, at 1656–67 (examining the 
question of whether fiduciaries have a duty to disclose in transactions with company 
shareholders). 
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markets from functioning efficiently. Rather than using the narrow 
“concrete benefits” scienter test as a way of separating good claims 
from bad, a stricter materiality standard is a more promising way of 
ensuring that securities fraud class actions are limited to 
misstatements that impact the market. 
Perhaps the main lesson of the unjust enrichment principle is that 
securities regulation is about more than efficient markets. There is a 
strong case, reflected both in Rule 10b-5 doctrine and in academic 
commentary, that public values play some role in regulating the 
conduct of market participants. Although there are qualms about 
allowing populism to influence the regulatory regime, the reality is 
that values such as the unjust enrichment principle continue to play 
an important role in securities regulation. Many see a test for unjust 
enrichment as unworkable; however, overenforcement is unlikely, 
and the Supreme Court’s decision in O’Hagan suggests a doctrinal 
foundation that can be modified so that a workable Rule 10b-5 unjust 
enrichment principle can continue to develop. 
